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JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF EXECUTIVE
SECRECY: RETHINKING FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION FOR GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES AND THE PUBLIC
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT

INFORMATION
May M. Cheht
INTRODUCTON

American presidents enjoy almost uncontrolled discretion to withhold military, diplomatic, and other "national security" information
from the public. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I the principal statutory protecton of the public's right to information, exempts disclosure of information properly classified as "secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy."' 2 Because the executive branch both
establishes the criteria for classification 3 and performs the actual classifit
Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.A. 1972, J.D. 1975
Rutgers University; LL.M. 1977, Harvard University.
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2 Id §552(b)(1)(A).
3
Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983) (establishing categories of information
eligible for three levels of classification: top secret, secret, and confidential). See Executive Order
on Security Clossiflation: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Government Information andIndividualRights
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Although executive
secrecy existed in one form or another since the founding of the nation, the first national
security system for the civil department of the federal government only appeared in an Executive Order issued by President Truman in 1951. Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789
(1949-1953), revokedby Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-1953), amendedby, 3 C.F.R.
292 (1971), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter all
recognized the need to revise these orders because they resulted in too much secrecy. See
Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-1953),amendedby, 3 C.F.R. 292 (197 1), repintedin
50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (Eisenhower Order); Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (19711975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. III 1973), implemented in accordance with National
Security Council Directive of May 17, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 10,053 (1972), 50 U.S.C. § 401
(Supp. III 1973) (Nixon Order); Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1978), reprintedin 50
U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1981) (Carter Order).
Only President Reagan has acted to increase secrecy. The current executive order retains
the three levels of classification--"Top Secret,....
Secret," and "Confidential"--which first
appeared in the Eisenhower Order. The new classfication order differs markedly from its
predecessor in that it requires that all doubts about classification be resolved in favor of secrecy. The Carter Order provided that certain categories of information could be kept secret
only if publication would result in "identifiable" damage to the national security; such information could be withheld only if the harm to national security outweighed the benefits of
public release of the information. The Reagan Order mandates secrecy upon any claim of
national security harm no matter how minor, remote, or speculative. It mandates continued
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cation of such information, the FOIA national security exception is not
4
so much an exemption as it is a license to withhold.
Judicially enforced constitutional restraints on the executive's
power to withhold information are even less effective. Courts tend to
draw a sharp constitutional distinction between the Executive's power
to withhold information and the Executive's power to recover informa5
tion that has already fallen into the hands of the press or the public.
The power to withhold is essentially unregulated; it is a matter generally
6
left to the good faith, good sense, and political choice of the President.
secrecy even if the public benefits from disclosure are clear and overwhelming. See Cheh,
Government Control ofPrivate Ideas-Striking a Balance between Sientifw Freedom and NationalSecurity,
23 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 18 (1982). For a historical summary of executive classification of
documents, see Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciagy, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3D, at 3063-144
(1972).
4 For a discussion of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the national security
exemption, see Note, National Security Information Under the Amended Freedom of Information Act:
HistoricalPerspectivesandAnal'ysis, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 759 (1976); Note, NationalSecurity andthe
Public'sRight to Know: A New Role for the Courts Under the Freedom of Information Act, 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 1438 (1975); Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom ofInformation Act, 85 YALE
L.J. 401-22 (1976). There is extensive literature on the FOIA. Useful general references include: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502) SOURCE
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE

MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, S. Doc. No. 82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Davis, The Information Act: A PreliminagAnalysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1967); Giannella, Agency Procedures
Implementing the Freedom oflnformationAct: A ProposalforUniform Regulations, 33 AD.L. REV. 217
(1971); Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestionsfor Making Information Available to the
Public, 32 MD. L. REV. 189 (1972); Nader, Freedomfrom Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974).
5 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)
(government's petition to enjoin New York Times from publishing Pentagon Papers). In his
concurrence Justice Stewart noted:
Yet it is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy. . . . T]he Executive must have the largely unshared
duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to
exercise . . . power successfully. . . . [I]t is the constitutional duty of the

Executive-as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as
the courts know law-through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense.
Id at 728-30 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 7983 (1975).
6 The power to withhold is, in some instances, within the discretion of other executive
officials. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (media has no constitutional
right of access to penal facilities). But cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980) (right of press to attend criminal trials constitutionally guaranteed).
The courts have, however, squarely faced and more strictly supervised claims that executive privilege excuses the President or executive officials from producing evidence in court. In
these cases specific constitutional due process interests are at stake as well as the courts' direct
interest in carrying out their constituitonal functions. There are a number of "executive privi-
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The power to recover is severely restricted; the courts will only assist the
Executive in preventing the dissemination of secrets if further revelation
7
would result in immediate and grave harm to the Nation.
The separation of powers doctrine explains this judicial treatment. 8
leges" or claims of power to withhold information; the courts "police" some more than others.
The state secrets privilege allows the government to resist discovery of information that if
disclosed would injure the national defense or foreign policy. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (government can invoke military secrets privilege to prevent release of documents under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 in Tort Claims Act case
resulting from military airplane crash). Although the court is the ultimate judge of the existence of the privilege in a given case, the standard for recognizing the privilege is relatively
easy to satisfy and designed to protect security interests. Courts will recognize the privilege if
there is a "reasonable danger that discovery will disclose information prejudicial to the national security." Note, The Militaty andState Secrets PrivilegeandProtectionfor the NationalSecurity
or Immunityfor the Executive?, 91 YALE LJ.570, 573-74 (1982). The privilege is, moreover,
absolute in that the courts do not balance the interests in disclosure against the interests in
secrecy. Id at 575 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), for proposition that
state secrets privilege is absolute). For a background discussion of this privilege, see Zagel,
The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1966).
Another privilege, specific to law enforcement, is the informer's privilege. It permits law
enforcement officials to withhold the identity of those "who furnish information of violations
of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law." Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 59 (1957) (citations omitted). Finally, there is an internal deliberation privilege with respect to governmental operations that presumptively protects presidential conversations and
correspondence. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Courts recognize that some
confidentiality is necessary to enable officials to perform their tasks. The courts have the final
say on whether to honor this privilege; they balance the moving party's need for the information against the Executive's reasons for insisting on confidentiality. Generalized assertions of
need for confidentiality will not prevail if there is a "demonstrated, specific need for evidence
in a pending criminal trial." Id at 713.
7 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); supra note 5. The
present Court's test of prior restraint is probably not as vigorous as the test used in the Pentagon Papers case. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976), the Supreme
Court employed the Learned Hand formulation-"whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger." See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993-94, 999 (W.D. Wis.)
(publication of article describing operation of hydrogen bomb "could possibly provide sufficient information" to enable nation to construct bomb or reduce time required to achieve
thermonuclear capability), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Cheh, The
ProgressiveCase andthe Atomic Energy Act: Waking to the Dangersof Government Information Controls,
48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 163, 199-200 (1980) (arguing that district court abandoned New York
Times rule in Progressive).
8 The differential treatment obviously makes little sense from the perspective of first
amendment values. Secrecy imposed from within can severely affect the rights of free expression of government employees and seriously curtail the amount of information available to
the public. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text. The dichotomy also makes little
sense in terms of the courts' competence to judge the need for secrecy. Judges do not become
wiser or better equipped to assess national security claims simply because a secret is now in
the hands of the press or a member of the public. Unlike issues involving the power to withhold information, however, the courts' duty to protect constitutional rights of free expression
once information has become public is very clear. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (publication of newspaper article on pending confidential
inquiry protected by first amendment); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(judge's order restraining publication or broadcast of criminal defendant's confessions or admissions violates first amendment).
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The judiciary has the constitutional power and duty to protect both individual liberty and the democratic process. The executive branch has
the power and duty to protect military and diplomatic secrets as well as
other sensitive governmental data.9 The distinction between the power
to withhold and the power to recover provides a bright, but arbitrary,
line along which to divide responsibilities between the two branches.
This line-drawing reflects a judicial reluctance to encroach upon presidential prerogatives in sensitive areas of military and foreign affairs and
a fear that any other approach would involve the courts in a standardless second-guessing of political judgments.' 0
Allowing the executive branch a virtual free hand to withhold information is not, however, cost free. It invites excessive secrecy and
abuse of power."1 It may result in silencing public employees or punishing them for "unauthorized" speech. It inevitably reduces the amount
of information available to the public. These dangers were illustrated
anew in the Supreme Court's decision in Snepp v. United States 12 and in
13
President Reagan's recently issued and now temporarily suspended
14
National Security Decision Directive (Directive).
In Snepp the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion without benefit of briefs or argument' 5 concluded that the Central Intelligence
9

See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see A. BIcKEL, supra note 5, at 79-87; BeVier,
An InformedPublic, an Informing Press: The Search for a ConstitutionalPrinciple, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
482, 510-16 (1980); Henki.n, The Right to Know and The Duy To Withhold- The Case Of The
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271 (1971).
11 See infra notes 22-30, 113-20 and accompanying text.
12 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
13 Amidst mounting public and congressional criticism, see infra note 125 and accompanying text, President Reagan has decided to suspend temporarily the prepublication review
and lie-detector provisions of the Directive. Reagan to Relent on Secrey Pledge, N.Y. Times, Feb.
14, 1984, at A1, col. 1. Observers believe he will seek a compromise of some sort with Congress or simply reissue the order if he is reelected.
14 National Security Decision Directive No. 84 (Mar. 11, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Directive], repfrinted in PresidentIssues Directive on Safeguarding NationalSecurity Information, 5 ABA
STANDING COMMITTEE L. AND NAT'L SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REP. 1 (May 1983).
15 The Court's summary action was especially questionable given the procedural posture
of the case. The CIA prevailed in the district court; that court issued an injunction and
imposed a constructive trust on the profits from Snepp's book. The court of appeals affirmed
on the merits, but reversed the award of a constructive trust and remanded for consideration
of punitive damages. Snepp sought Supreme Court review on his first amendment claims
and, in response, the government filed a conditional cross-petition for certiorari on the question of damages. The government stated that it was satisfied with its award to that point and
sought review only if the Court agreed to hear Snepp's claims. The Supreme Court summarily dismissed Snepp's claims and essentially addressed the question of further relief for the
government. Justice Stevens noted the impropriety of this action stating: "Given the Government's position, it would be highly inappropriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's
jurisdiction, to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's. Yet that is in essence
what has been done." Snepp, 444 U.S. at 524 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a
10
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Agency (CIA) could require government employees to sign prepublication review agreements as a condition of employment. 16 Frank Snepp, a
former CIA agent, wrote a book entitled Decent Interval that was highly
critical of CIA activities in Vietnam but contained no classified information. 17 Snepp had signed a prepublication review agreement but published his book without first submitting it to the CIA for clearance. 18
The agreement prohibited Snepp from publishing any information
about the agency-classified or unclassified, important or innocuouswithout receiving prior government approval. 19 In an action by the
government for breach of contract, the Court, in a six-to-three decision,
not only upheld the contract and enjoined Snepp from further violations, but also invoked the equitable doctrine of constructive trust and
confiscated, for the government's benefit, all of Snepp's future publicafootnote Justice Stevens added: "I have been unable to discover any previous case in which
the Court has acted as it does today, reaching the merits of a conditional cross-petition despite
its belief that the petition does not merit granting certiorari." Id at 524 n.15. See Cox, The
Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword Freedom ofExpression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1, 8-10 (1980) (criticizing Court for not giving case "deliberate judicial consideration").
16 444 U.S. at 509 n.3. Commentary on Snepp has been decidedly negative. See, e.g.,
Anawalt, A Critical Appraisalof Snepp v. United States: Are There Alternatives to Government
Censorship?, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 697 (1981); Medow, The FirstAmendment and the Secreg
State.- Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775 (1982); Comment, Snepp v. United
States: The CIA Secrecy Agreement and the First Amendment, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 662 (1981).
17 The government stipulated that Snepp's book contained neither classified information nor any information about the CIA that the CIA had not already made public. United
States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 931 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)(per
curiam).
18 United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd in part, 595 F.2d
926 (4th Cir. 1979), reinstatedper curiam, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
19 One must distinguish prepublication review agreements from other "secrecy agreements" that merely prohibit the employee from disclosing classified information. Under this
latter type of agreement, previously known as the "standard form secrecy agreement," an
employee or former employee need not submit his writings prior to publication. He is liable
under the contract only if he publishes or divulges classified information. For a discussion of
this type of agreement, see Comment, Government Secrecy Agreements And The FirstAmendment, 28
AM. U.L. REv. 395, 396-99 (1979). In United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the
standard form secrecy agreement and enjoined former CIA agent Victor Marchetti from publishing a book about the CIA without first getting CIA clearance. 466 F.2d at 1316-18. Although the injunction rested on Marchetti's repeated past disclosures of classified information
and his planned publication of classified information, it converted Marchetti's agreement into
a form of prepublication review. In contrast to the conclusion reached in Snepp, the Fourth
Circuit explained:
We readily agree with Marchetti that the First Amendment limits the
extent to which the United States, contractually or otherwise, may impose
secrecy requirements upon its employees and enforce them with a system of
prior censorship. It precludes such restraints with respect to information
which is unclassified or officialy disclosed . ...
Id at 1313. In Snepp the Supreme Court distinguished Marchetti stating that the Fourth Circuit only adjudged the constitutionality of the standard form agreement and "therefore did
not consider the appropriate remedy for the breach of an agreement to submit all material for
prepublication review." 444 U.S. at 510 n.4 (emphasis in original).
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tion profits. 20 The Court did not explicitly confine its holding to intelligence agencies' use and, indeed, seemed to suggest that the government
could require prepublication review agreements from any employee who
2
had access to confidential information. '
Armed with Snepp's reaffirmation of the Executive's broad power to
withhold information, President Reagan has taken a series of unprecedented actions to increase the amount of information classified as secret
and to prevent leakage of all such information. 22 President Reagan's
20 The majority opinion, issued per curiam, was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined in the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Stevens.
The Court's majority and dissenting opinions were primarily devoted to the propriety of
imposing the constructive trust remedy. The district court applied the constructive trust remedy but the court of appeals reversed and remanded to compute punitive damages. The
court of appeals reasoned that the constructive trust remedy was appropriate only to redress a
breach of fiduciary duty and prevent unjust enrichment. The court of appeals concluded that
Snepp was not a fiduciary and that he was not unjustly enriched by earning profits based
exclusively on his own efforts and without use of classified information. 595 F.2d at 935-36.
On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court held that Snepp, as a fiduciary, breached not
only his contract but also his duty of confidentiality arising from his position of trust. The
majority concluded that under such circumstances the constructive trust remedy was appropriate. 444 U.S. at 515-16. More to the point, however, the majority viewed alternative remedies as not forceful or severe enough to deter Snepp or others from bypassing prepublication
review, Id at 514.
Justice Stevens in dissent argued that "Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty. . . ." Id at 518. Snepp "did
not use confidential information in his book" and the CIA "would have been obliged to clear
[Snepp's] book for publication in precisely the same form as it now stands. Thus . . . the
Government, rather than Snepp, will be unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits
attributable entirely to his own legitimate activity." Id at 521 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
At the time of suit, Snepp had already received about $60,000 in advance payments. 456
F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Va. 1978). The book earned many thousands thereafter. As Snepp
had already spent a good deal of his advance, Snepp's case demonstrates the severity of the
constructive trust remedy. The damage award left him in debt and he was forced to write
and lecture just to break even.
Commentators have criticized the Court's use of the constructive trust remedy on several
grounds. Although most agree that the imposition of monetary penalties is an appropriate
remedy, they would limit such relief to the actual harm caused by knowing disclosures of only
classified information. See, e.g., Medow, supra note 16, at 835-56.
21 See 444 U.S. at 507 n.3.
22 One observer summarized President Reagan's actions as follows:
In the two and a half years it has been in power, the Reagan Administration
has:
[1] Consistently sought to limit the scope of the Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A).
[2] Barred the entry into the country of foreign speakers, including
Hortensia Allende, widow of Chilean President Salvador Allende,
because of concern about what they might say.
[3] Inhibited the flow of films into and even out of our borders. . ..
[4] Rewritten the classification system to assure that more rather than
less information will be classified.
[5] Subjected governmental officials to an unprecedented system of lifetime censorship.
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Directive is perhaps the most extraordinary of these actions; it accepts
the tacit invitation of Snepp and extends the use of prepublication review
23
agreements to the entire executive branch.
The Directive requires hundreds of thousands of federal employees
with access to classified data to sign agreements not to disclose that information. 24 Thousands more, with access to high-level classified data,
must also sign Snepp-like prepublication review agreements.2 5 This includes at a minimum all senior officials in the Departments of State and
Defense, all members of the National Security Council and staff, all senior military and foreign service officers, and many senior White House
officials. 26 Like Frank Snepp, all of these officials will be bound by a
lifetime obligation to submit all books, lectures, speeches, and testimony
that are based on their previous government experience for prepublication review. 27 Advance clearance is required even if the information
[6]

Flooded universities with a torrent of threats relating to their right
to publish and discuss unclassified information-usually of a scientific or technological nature-on campus.
Abrams, The New EfJfrt To Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at
22-23 (emphasis in original); see also Cheh, supra note 3, at 3-4, 28 n.188.
23 The Directive followed and was in part based on recommendations made to the President by an interdepartmental group headed by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard
K. Willard. Study Recommended Reagan's NationalSecurity Directive, 5 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE L. AND NAT'L SECURITY INTELUGENCE REP. 2, 7 (June 1983).
24 President OrdersCurbs In Handlingof ClassifiedData, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1983, at I, col.
4 (estimate of number of federal employees affected). The Directive provides: "All persons
with- authorized access to classified information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure
agreement as a condition of access." Directive, supra note 14, § L.a., reprintedin President Issues
Directive on SafeguardingNational Security Information, 5 ABA STANDING COMMITEE L. AND
NAT'L SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REP. 1, 2 (May 1983).
25 The Directive also provides that: "All persons with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition
of access to SCI . . . ." Directive, supra note 14, § 1.b., reprinted in President Issues Directive on
SafeguardingNationalSecurity Information, 5 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE L. AND NAT'L SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REP. 1, 2 (May 1983). SCI is "information that not only is classified for
national security reasons as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but also is subject to special
access and handling requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive
intelligence sources and methods." Department of Justice, Internal Security Order No.
2620.8, § 4, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,313, 39,314 (1983). See also Abrams, supra note 22, at 22.
26 Abrams, supra note 22, at 22; Halperin, Reagan's NationalSecurity Censorship: A Mockey
of this First Amendment, 8 FIRST PRINCIPLES Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 1.
27 Abrams noted that:
prepublication review will be required of all books (fiction or non-ficton),
newspaper columns, magazine articles, letters to the editor, pamphlets and
scholarly papers by officials with access to S.C.I. materials so long as what is
written describes activities that relate to SCI, classified information from intelligence reports or "any information"-classified or not--"concerning intelligence activities, sources or methods."
Under the new policy, there is no need to submit for prepublication review material consisting "solely of personal views, opinions or judgments" on
topics such as "proposed legislation or foreign policy." But the Catch-22 is
this: If the opinion even implies "any statement of fact" that falls within the
range of review, then the material must be cleared by the Government before
it is published. Since most opinions worth expressing about American defense
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contained in the writing is unclassified, unimportant, already public, or
widely known. 28 The Directive also goes beyond Snepp by authorizing
executive agencies to use lie detectors to investigate unauthorized disclosures of classified data 29 and by mandating punishment for those who
30
leak information or fail to cooperate in the investigation of leaks.
These developments raise the question whether Congress or the
courts can play a more active role in supervising executive power to
withhold government information and thus play a more active role in
checking the abuses of executive secrecy. This article focuses primarily
on the courts. It proceeds from the premise that current constitutional
doctrine-which effectively offers a choice of either unlimited presidential power to withhold information or standardless, judicial secondguessing of executive secrecy decisions-presents a false dilemma. There
or intelligence policies at least imply some proscribed facts, what the new
requirement amounts to is a massive intrusion of the Government into the
right of former officials to speak and of the public to listen.
Abrams, supra note 22, at 25 (quoting Department of Justice, Internal Security Order No.
2620.8, supra note 25, § 5.d, .h). For an even broader interpretation of what prepublication
review may cover, see Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506, 510 (D.D.C. 1980) (injunction based
upon prepublication review and past history of unauthorized disclosures extends to all oral
statements except those "[e]xtemporaneous oral remarks that consist solely of personal views"
and even to information learned outside CIA employment).
28 See Abrams, supra note 22, at 25.
29 The Directive requires that all agencies having access to classified data revise their
regulations
so that employees may be required to submit to polygraph examinations,
when appropriate, in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures
of classified information. As a minimum, such regulations shall permit an
agency to decide that appropriate adverse consequences will follow an employee's refusal to cooperate with a polygraph examination that is limited in
scope to the circumstances of the unauthorized disclosure under investigation.
Directive, supra note 14, § 5, reprintedin President Issues Directive on Safeguarding NationalSecurity
Information, 5 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE L. AND NAT'L SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REP. 1,
13 (May 1983). Although this article focuses on the prepublication review features of the
Directive, it must be noted that this provision itself raises serious due process issues. The
polygraph is not only an arguably unreliable instrument for determining truth, but it necessarily invades individual privacy because polygraph methods invariably elicit answers to
questions well beyond the matter at hand. See Pyle, Managingby Intimidation, 8 FIRST PRINCIPLES Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 1, 2, 10; see also Craver, The InquisitorialProcess In PrivateEmployment,
63 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 28-30 (1977); Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522, 529 n.41 (1982). See general' Note, The PresidentialPolygraph Orderand
the Fourth Amendment: Subjecting Federal Employees to Warrantless Searches, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
896 (1984).
30 Directive, supra note 14, §§ 2.e., 5, reprintedin PresidentIssues Directive on SafeguardingNationalSecurity Information, 5 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE L. AND NAT'L SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REP. 1, 13 (May 1983). The Directive also requires all agencies to adopt appropriate
policies "to govern contacts between media representatives and agency personnel, so as to
reduce the opportunity for negligent or deliberate disclosures of classified information." Id
§ l.d. It is unclear what additional restriction these new policies will entail. See also White
House Eases on Contacts, Starts New Leak Control System, Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1982, at A5,
col. 1 (discussing short lived presidential directive requiring advance approval by "a senior
official" of all contacts between reporters and officials "in which classified National Security
Council matters or classified intelligence information are discussed").
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are better ways to umpire the competition between presidential prerogatives and judicial protection of freedom of speech and the free flow of
information to the public. The answer lies, first, in distinguishing between the government's methods of keeping secrets and the type of information that requires secrecy. It lies, second, in strengthening the first
amendment rights of government employees-against whom most
methods of secrecy are directed-and in understanding the nature,
source, and limits of a constitutional right of access to government
information.
Part I of this article argues that courts can and should actively supervise executive decisions regulating how secrets are kept by requiring
the President to respect the free speech rights of government employees.
Part II suggests that courts have an important, although necessarily
more limited, role in supervising executive decisions concerning what
information should be kept secret. The courts' latter role is confined to
(1) ensuring that the President does not unnecessarily restrict the flow of
government information to the public or use secrecy to hide violations of
law and (2) preserving a new, due-process-based right of access to certain governmental institutions. The courts simply cannot decide, by
force of the Constitution alone, whether particular information should
be classified or released to the public. Recasting the free speech rights
of government employees and reformulating the public right of access
will yield a doctrine that is more consistent with underlying constitutional values. Additionally, such an analysis will generate principled
rules by which courts can restrain the kind of excess of executive secrecy
embodied in Snepp and the Directive.
I
THE METHODS OF MAINTAINING SECRECY-RETHINKING
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES

Everyone acknowledges that all governments must sometimes keep
certain information from public view. The difficult issues involve determining what information should be kept secret, who should decide, and
how secrecy should be enforced. The Snepp case and President Reagan's
Directive focus on the methods of maintaining secrecy and assume that
decisions about what information should be kept secret are legitimately
made by the Executive pursuant to guidelines found in Executive Order
No. 12,356, entitled NationalSecurity Information.31 In reality, the issues of
what information should be kept secret and how secrecy should be enforced are closely related. 32 For example, preserving the confidential
31
32

Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,

1984]

EXECUTIVE SECRECY

699

status of a few particularly sensitive documents will almost certainly require less active enforcement than withholding many thousands of documents. Nevertheless, by separating the two issues, one can assess the
Snepp decision and the Directive on their own terms. More importantly,
one can set out more precisely the appropriate judicial role for checking
the abuses of executive secrecy.
The Executive enforces secrecy in both formal and informal ways.
Formally, the Executive selects trustworthy personnel,3 3 maintains the
physical security of secret data,3 4 conditions employment on promises of
secrecy,3 5 and investigates3 6 and punishes breaches of security.37 Although the Directive relies primarily on the last two methods, all of
these strategies, except physical controls, can intrude upon constitutional liberties such as freedom of speech or equal protection of the law.
To illustrate, in conditioning employment on promises of secrecy, the
government might ask that employees avoid criticism of government
policies or restrict their contact with members of the press.38 In hiring
only trustworthy personnel, the government might reject individuals
along impermissible lines, refusing to hire communists, homosexuals, or
39
women.
One way to check excesses in withholding information is to limit
the President to methods of maintaining secrecy that respect constitutional rights, particularly the fragile right of freedom of expression protected by the first amendment.40 Emphasizing constitutional limits on
concurring) ("[Wihen everything is classified, then nothing is classified...."); Cheh, supra
note 3, at 26.
33 Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 4.1(a), 3 C.F.R. 166, 174 (1983) ("A person is eligible for
access to classified information provided that a determination of trustworthiness has been
made. .. 2).
34 Id § 4.1(b).

35 See, e.g., Comment, sufpra note 19, at 397-406 (general description and analysis of governmental secrecy and prepublication review agreements).
36 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 1.7(d), 3 C.F.R. 200, 205 (1982) (heads of certain
government departments must report possible unlawful intelligence activities to Intelligence
Oversight Board).
37 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 5.4(c), 3 C.F.R. 166, 177 (1983) (listing sanctions
for violating that order).
38 The Directive anticipates at least some restrictions on employee-press contacts, but
does not control how each agency will implement its rules. Directive, sufira note 14, § l.d,
reprintedin PresidentIssues Directive on SafeguardingNationalSecurity Information, 5 ABA STANDING
COMMrrTEE L. AND NAT'L SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REP. 1, 13 (May 1983); see supra note
30.
39 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 260 (1967) (Court invalidated statute
criminalizing attempt by any member of communist-action organization "'to engage in any
employment in any defense facility' "').
40 The courts have recognized that no matter how important particular secrets may be,
the means of protecting them must still comply with constitutional norms. See, e.g., United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (" '[E]ven the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.' ") (quoting Home Bldg. Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)); Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D.D.C. 1980).
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methods will avoid serious separaton of power difficulties because the
courts are not required to second-guess presidential decisions on what
information must be withheld and what information may be disclosed.
The President retains discretion to make these decisons but he is restrained in the means available to protect secret information.
Admittedly, some methods of ensuring secrecy are more efficient
than others. For example, firing all suspected leakers might be more
efficient than investigating and adjudicating the guilt of each actual
transgressor. If constitutional values are to mean anything, however,
they must rank higher than convenience and efficiency. 4 1 Similarly,
some methods of maintaining secrecy are more effective than others.
Censoring all employee expression may be more effective than post hoc
punishment for wrongful disclosure. 42 Nevertheless, forcing the President to respect constitutional liberties reaffirms the notion that constitutional rights must be taken seriously 43 and, that consequently, liberty

must sometimes outrank effectiveness. Effectiveness is not, in any event,
a zero-sum game. What the President cannot accomplish in one way, he
can usually accomplish in another way. Indeed, ultimate effectiveness is
never sacrificed; if a particular method is necessary to achieve a compel44
ling objective, constitutional rights are not absolute and will give way.
A.

The Inadequacy of Current Employee Speech Protections

For decades, courts considered government employment and other
forms of government largess privileges, not rights. 45 As privileges they
could be offered on any condition the government imposed including
the sacrifice of constitutional rights. 46 In recent years, the Supreme
41 This theme is pervasive in constitutional law. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 266 (1970) (procedural safeguards necessary to protect welfare applicant's due process
right take precedence over inconvenience to government of conducting hearings prior to termination of aid).
42 Censorship may, in fact, be less effective than criminal penalties. See infra note 121
and accompanying text.
43 See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 190-92 (1977).
44 See, e.g., Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422,
433-38 (1980).
45 As the oft-quoted phrase of Justice Holmes explains: "The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). See Van
Alstyne, The Demise ofthe Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439,
1439.40 (1968).
46 It is surprising that the right-privilege distinction lasted as long as it did. As a basis
for overriding the constitutional rights of public employees, the distinction is analytically
empty. As others have shown, it simply does not follow that merely because someone is not
entitled to a job, he must comply with outrageous conditions in order to keep it. See Van
Alstyne, supra note 45, at 1458-60. Calling public employment a privilege was just another
way of announcing a court's conclusion that it would grant no relief. See id. at 1459. In
addition to being logically unsound, the right-privilege distinction carried implications that
were impossible to accept. If the government could really condition employment or largess
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Court has rejected the idea that public employment is a privilege 47 and
has thus laid the foundation for requiring executive actions, including
secrecy decisions, to conform to constitutional norms. The Court has
recognized, for example, that public employees do not sacrifice rights of
free expression merely upon assuming the status of public employee.4 8
Before the first amendment rights of public employees can serve as
an effective check on executive secrecy methods aimed at silencing public employees or punishing them for "unauthorized" speech and, indeed,
before public employees can enjoy meaningful first amendment rights, a
fundamental flaw in the Court's treatment of employee free speech issues must be corrected and a new analytic framework constructed. Currently the Court does not protect a government employee's speech under
the exacting scrutiny4 9 of traditional first amendment doctrine. Instead,
on any basis it chose, then presumably, it could offer public housing only to Republicans, fire
government employees for voting for the "wrong" candidates, or summarily suspend a physician's license to practice medicine because he criticized United States foreign policy. See id at
1445-49. After developing a variety of exceptions to escape the consequences of the doctrine,
see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (exception of "unconstitutional condition"), the courts simply announced the demise of the right-privilege distinction.
The "privileged" nature of government employment still exerts, however, a strong influence over judicial thinking. Consider, for example, the district court's finding in Snepp that
"[Snepp] knew that employment by the government was a privilege-not a right." United
States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Va. 1978).
47 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262 (1970). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 45.
48 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("[Tlhe theory that
public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.' ") (quoting Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967)).
49
This article makes no attempt to refashion general first amendment doctrine. There
is, however, a good deal of literature on the appropriate general approach to first amendment
adjudication and no paucity of different theories and views. See generaly T. EMERSON, THE
OF EXPRESSION (1970); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Karst,
Equality as a CentralArincple in the FirstAmendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
In referring to traditional first amendment analysis, this article refers primarily to two
guiding principles on which there seems to be substantial agreement among theorists and
judges. One guiding principle is that expression, defined as nonviolent, noncoercive conduct
intended to communicate ideas and emotions, is entitled to special and vigorous judicial protection. Government regulations aimed at the content of such expression, as opposed to time,
place, and manner restrictions unrelated to content, are presumptively unconstitutional. This
protection may be "full" or "absolute," see, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra, or it may be accomplished via a refined balancing test that makes the government establish a compelling need
for its action unrelated to suppression and limits the government to means precisely tailored
to avoid unnecessary abridgement of first amendment interests. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 580-84 (1978). No matter what one thinks of this form
of balancing or the least restrictive means analysis, it seems clear that a fundamental difference exists between the refined balancing test and the simple ad hoc balancing and reasonableness standards. Refined balancing requires a government to show that a restriction was
essential to a need unrelated to suppression, and to assure that there was no better way to
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
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the Court employs a standard that is weak and easy to manipulate. According to the Court's standard, acceptable limits on employee expression may include content restrictions and even prior restraints as long as
the government regulations are reasonably necessary to further an important government objective, and, as long as, on balance, the government's need for secrecy outweighs the employee's interest in free
speech. 50 Under such a standard, it is more accurate to view employee
accomplish the objective. The second guiding principle is that certain forms of control over
expression-prior restraints--are almost wholly prohibited. Only a very few, narrowly defined exceptions to the general prohibition are permissible. The exception based on national
security requires, for example, clear and convincing government proof that a given publication will result in grave, irreparable harm to the United States. New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713 (1971).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972). The test evolved arid progressively weakened over time. When the courts discarded the right-privilege distinction they never seemed entirely sure about what should replace it. On the one hand, the courts recognized that it was unacceptable to permit the
government to condition employment on any grounds it chose, but on the other they also
recognized distinctions between the government's interests as an employer and its interests as
a sovereign. Initially the courts seemed to follow the approach suggested here, incorporating
employee first amendment rights into traditional doctrine and accounting for the government's interests as employer only within the framework of that preexisting doctrine. See, e.g.,
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967). In Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), however, the Court, in upholding the right of a teacher to criticize the operations of a school system, stated that the approach is a "balance" and suggested courts should measure employees' free speech rights
under standards less severe than ordinarily applied:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.
Id at 568. After Pickering, the Court occasionally invoked traditional first amendment standards in cases invoking employee first amendment rights. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 363 (1976) (dismissal of employee struck down because it did not "further some vital
government end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association"); see
also Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (applying the E/rod approach). Increasingly,
however, despite occasional strict language, the courts have tended to apply a "loose" reasonableness test. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 564-67 (1973); see Comment, supra note 16, at 407-10; Comment, NationalSeculy
and The First Amendment: The CIA In The Marketplace ofIdeas, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 655,
672-81 (1979). Touchstones of first amendment strict scrutiny such as less drastic means analysis and rigorous vagueness and overbreadth standards were eroded in employee speech cases.
See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (overbreadth must be "substantial").
Compare Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597-610 (1967) (state law providing
that public school teachers who engage in "seditious" utterances or acts may be fired is unconstitutionally vague, and state law providing that public school teachers who are members
of Communist Party may be fired is unconstitutionally overbroad) with Cole v. Richardson,
405 U.S. 676, 683-86 (1972) (termination of state employee for failure to take oaths to "uphold and defend" constitutions of Massachusetts and United States and to "oppose the overthrow" of those two governments was constitutional and oaths were not void for vagueness).
In the recent case of Connick v. Myers, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983) (a 5-4 ruling upholding the
discharge of a former assistant district attorney because of on-the-job speech addressed to,
inter alia, transfer policies of the office), a bare majority of the Court suggested a refinement
to the balancing test. The government, it said, has greater latitude to regulate on-the-job
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first amendment guarantees as only due process checks against
arbitrariness.
In Snepp v. United States the Supreme Court indicated that this type
of diluted first amendment protection even applies tofonner government
employees where the expression at issue grows out of, or in some sense
relates back to, the former employment. 5 1 Snepp, a former CIA agent,
claimed that the CIA prepublication review agreement was "unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected speech." '52 Snepp invoked traditional first amendment doctrine arguing that (1) his book contained no
classified information and was political speech lying at the core of first
amendment protections; (2) prepublication review was a prior restraint
that could be sustained only by the government's clear and convincing
showing that such a restraint was necessary to prevent immediate, inevitable, and grave harm to the Nation; and, (3) such a showing was not
made with respect to his unclassified critique of CIA policies in
53
Vietnam.
The Court did not reject Snepp's formulation of traditional first
amendment doctrine, nor did the majority disagree with Justice Stevens's dissenting observation that prepublication review would be unconstitutional if applied to ordinary citizens.5 4 Nevertheless the Court
summarily dismissed Snepp's claim in a footnote.5 5 The CIA agreement, it said, was a "reasonable means" of protecting "the secrecy of
information important to our national security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."156 Some scholars have attributed this abrupt treatment
to the majority's distaste for Snepp's actions.5 7 The legal doctrine that
made the outcome possible and even likely, however, originated not in
political bias but rather in the diluted standard of review applied to the
employee speech unrelated to "any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community"; and less latitude to regulate such speech if related to matters of "public concern." Id
at 1690. The basic flaw in the "refinement" - aside from inherent weakness of ad hoc balancing as a means of protecting expression - is that it makes.first amendment safeguards depend
on the Court's view of the value or importance of particular speech rather than focus on the
adequacy of the government's justification to regulate that speech.
Under an appropriate first amendment analysis, it should not matter whether an in51
dividual is an employee or a former employee. See infta notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
Rather, the analysis should depend upon whether the employee revealed information that he
acquired in confidence, knowing it to be confidential, and whether the information is otherwise unavailable to the public.
52 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
53
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Litwack, The
Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519 (1977).
54
444 U.S. at 520 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55 Id at 509 n.3.
56 Id
57

See Cox, sufra note 15, at 8-9.
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free expression rights of public employees. The question is: Are these
weakened, reasonableness-balancing standards legitimate or justifiable?
The usual justification lies in the government's greater and more
obvious interest in controlling the behavior of its employees than its interest in controlling the conduct of citizens in general. 58 Applying
rigorous first amendment rules to the public workplace, the argument
runs, would deny the government the common and ordinary prerogatives of an employer, disrupt normal and efficient operations, and open
the door to special harms caused only by employee speech. Unfortunately, the reasonableness-balancing test is a crude method of differentiating between the rights of employees and citizens.
Under this test, the government may censor, regulate, and punish
merely because the source of speech is a public employee. To be sure,
this allows the government wide latitude in controlling its employees,
but it does so at a considerable loss to employee liberty and sacrifice of
first amendment values. It also risks a general weakening of first amendment standards as it is likely, perhaps inevitable, that the precedents
established in employee speech cases will be carried over to other kinds
of speech issues. There is evidence that this creeping dilution has already occurred. 59
1.

The Special Problem of the Speaker's Identity

The error and illegitimacy of the reasonableness-balancing ap58 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-73 (1968). For a discussion of
Picketing, see supra note 50. For a discussion of the private employer's interesi in controlling
employee speech, see Note, Free Speech, the PrivateEmplyee, andState Constitutions, 91 YALE LJ.
522 (1982).
Of course, employee speech, even on-the-job speech, is not always different from citizen
speech. To take an example, consider an employee of the Department of Transportation who
complains about working conditions, criticizes foreign policy in a letter to a newspaper, or
simply engages in conversation with coworkers. The government's interest in controlling or
suppressing such speech is not always stronger or more legitimate than in controlling or suppressing citizen speech. More importantly, even if the government's interest were stronger or
more legitimate, it simply does not follow that that interest can only be taken into account by
diluting ordinarily applicable first amendment protections.
Support for the weak reasonableness-balancing test may also lie in judicial fear that
extensive supervision of employer decisions affecting free speech will inundate the courts with
litigation, cause undue friction and interference with executive branch decisionmaking, and
result in excessive formalization of what is essentially the informal, flexible relationship of
federal employer and employee. Whatever force such fears may have had in the past, they
are no longer substantial today. Federal employees labor under an extensive and formal
system of rules and protections which are ultimately enforced by the courts. The harms, if
any, which flow from such supervision have long since occurred.
59 Structural concessions in any area of first amendment protections tend to weaken the
overall structure of those protections. For example, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973), the Supreme Court weakened first amendment overbreadth doctrine by requiring
that overbreadth be "substantial." Although Broadrick was an employee free speech case decided under less rigorous first amendment standards, it has become the authority for the
"substantial" overbreadth rule applied generally in first amendment law.
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proach is manifest in all of the cases where the Court has considered
whether the identity of the speaker (or source of speech), whether public
employee, 60 student, 61 corporation, 62 or member of the military, 63 deprives speech of its ordinary and rigorous first amendment protections.
The chief difficulty arises when the Court fails to distinguish the two
ways in which identity can be relevant in constitutional adjudication.
In the first case, identity operates as a threshold question and can
negate the existence of the constitutional right at issue. For example,
only "citizens" as opposed to persons or corporations enjoy the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship. 64 In the second case, identity is
relevant, but only in a subsidiary way as one of many factors used to
decide whether a court will honor an existing constitutional right in a
particular case. 65 The distinction is crucial because once a court makes
the initial determination that identity is irrelevant and that a constitutional right exists, it follows that all of the rules that ordinarily protect
such a right apply. This is so because a "right" is simply the sum total
or all the rules that give it life.
2.

The Lessons of Bellotti

The case of FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti 66 presents a good example
of the use and misuse of identity in first amendment theory. In Bellotti,
the Supreme Court concluded that the first amendment protects expenditures made to influence voting on public questions whether the
speaker is a corporation or an individual. In reaching its conclusion, the
majority ignored the textual question of whether corporations possess
the same first amendment rights as "persons" within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. The majority labeled this issue the "wrong
question," 67 explaining that concentration on the narrow question of
whether corporations are "persons" ignores the dual nature of the first
amendment. The first amendment protects both the right of the indi60 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
61 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (reversing lower court rulings
that school board could prohibit students from wearing black bands in protest of Vietnam
war).
62 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.765, reh g denied, 438 U.S. 107 (1978).
63 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (reversing lower court rulings that military base
commander could not require prior approval for petitions circulated at military installations
regarding grooming regulations); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (reversing lower court
rulings that military authorities could not prohibit political demonstrations within public
areas of military installation).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15
ARiz. L. REv. 369, 387 (1973) (discussing citizenship limit as tenuous safeguard of liberties).
65 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-13 (1969) (that student
protest took place within school setting was one factor in Court's analysis but not
determinative).

66

435 U.S. 765 (1978).

67

Id at 776.
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vidual to speak and the collective right to hear and to be informed. 68
The majority found that corporate expenditures made in connection
with a public referendum were a form of speech "at the heart of" first
amendment protection. 69 It was, therefore, protected speech notwithstanding "the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
'70
union, or individual.
Having thus eliminated corporate identity as a relevant threshold
consideration, the majority invoked traditional first amendment "strict
scrutiny" and struck down the Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited corporations from spending money on referenda issues unconnected with corporate business. In the majority's view, the statute,
prohibiting the speech itself, was neither justified by a "compelling" interest nor narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary abridgement of free
speech interests. 71 The majority acknowledged that corporate identity
could be relevant as a subsidiary factor in determining whether the government had a compelling interest in regulating speech. Because the
state had not, however, shown any particular evil flowing from the corporate source of the speech nor any special need to protect interests
unique to a corporation, such as the interests of shareholders, 72 the majority also found corporate identity to be irrelevant as a subsidiary
factor.
Four Justices dissented. Justice Rehnquist concluded that corporate identity was relevant in the fundamental, threshold sense, resting
68

Id at 776-77 & n.12.

69

Id

70

Id at 777. The Court added:

at 776.

We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the
decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would
be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply
because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a
court, a material effect on its business or property.
d at 784.
71 Id at 786-95. The Court conceded that preserving the integrity of the electoral process, a chief argument advanced to support the statute, was an interest of "the highest importance." The Court, however, stated that "there has been no showing that the relative voice of
corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts. . . ." Id at 789. The Court might have taken a different view "[i]f appellee's
arguments were supported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes. . . ." Id Rejecting the state's
second justification---"preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views with
which some shareholders may disagree," id at 792-93--the Court found the statute was both
underinclusive and overinclusive. It was underinclusive because it made no attempt to prohibit corporate lobbying or expenditures on public issues not on a ballot, id at 793, and was
overinclusive because it would prohibit corporate referenda expenditures even if the shareholders unanimously authorized that action. Id at 794.
72 Id at 777-78 n.13. The Court found no "occasion to consider in thiS case whether,
under different circumstances, ajusliftation for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as applied to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to
corporations, unions, or like entities." Id (emphasis added).
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his view primarily on the fourteenth amendment's textual restriction to
"persons. '73 Corporations, Rehnquist argued, were not persons for the
purpose of enjoying all of the liberties constitutionally extended to natural persons but only for those "'incidental to its very existence.' ,,74 He
doubted whether the right of political expression was such a liberty and
suggested that corporations, as corporations, did not enjoy the right to
freedom of speech on public referenda having no material effect on their
business.
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, seemed to
view corporate identity as significant both as a fundamental, threshold
issue and as a subsidiary factor in evaluating the government's interest
in regulating speech. The dissenters' failure to distinguish the two issues
clearly, however, led them into a novel and highly questionable reading
of the first amendment. Justice White began by asking whether
profitmaking corporations enjoyed first amendment rights. 75 He followed the majority's approach of ignoring the textual question of corporations' "personhood," and asked whether the values of free expression
were served by such corporate speech. Justice White wrote that the
"principal" values of "self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment" 76 were not at all furthered by this kind of corporate speech and
that the first amendment value of fostering the exposition of ideas was
only minimally served. 77 From this he concluded that, although,
profitmaking corporations possessed some freedom of speech, they did
not enjoy the freedom of individual self-expression traditionally protected by the first amendment. 78 They enjoyed only a diluted right, a
new form of free speech protected under diminished standards of
79
review.
Perhaps Justice White meant only to conclude that corporate
speech was important as a subsidiary factor, and that Massachusetts had
an overriding and compelling justification to regulate such speech. The
Massachusetts statute, Justice White said, prevented "corporate domination" of the electoral process and "the coerced support by sharehold435 U.S. at 822-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id at 824 (quoting Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 636 (1819)).
75 Id at 804-06.
76 I d at 804.
77 id at 804-07.
78 Id at 804.
79 435 U.S. at 806-07 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White assigned corporate speech
lower priority than individual self-expression, particularly in the context of a political question. White questioned the corporation's ability to represent the views of all of its shareholders, valuing the individual opinions of shareholders higher than the corporation's right to
express its general interests. White stated: "Ideas which are not a product of individual
choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection." See id at 807.
73
74
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ers of causes with which they disagree."8 0 He seemed, however, to be
saying something more; his remarks seemed to touch on the threshold
question of identity as well. He appeared to suggest that the Court
could calibrate first amendment rights according to how well a particular speaker served the values of freedom of expression. If a certain
speaker did not significantly advance those values, then the Court would
minimally safeguard even political speech, a kind of expression normally
entitled to full first amendment protection. Serious unanswered questions attend such a view, such as what other types of speakers may be
subjected to those minimal first amendment protections. How will the
court judge and calibrate the extent to which a speaker serves first
amendment values? What implications will such "refinements" have for
the entire system of freedom of expression, which would now be based
not only on the nature of the speech but also on the identity of the

speaker?8'
80
81

435 U.S. at 821; see also id at 809.
Perhaps most troublesome is the mischief necessarily worked by drawing distinctions,

as the dissenters had to do, between profit corporations and nonprofit corporations, between
media corporations and nonmedia corporations, between corporate communications in the
form of advertising, promotions, and matters related to the functioning of the corporation
and other forms of communication. Justice White recognized that certain corporate communications, such as advertising, are essential to the public's right to receive information. He
concluded that "[n]one of these considerations . .. are implicated by a prohibition upon
corporate expenditures relating to referenda concerning questions of general public concern
having no connection with corporate business affairs." Id at 808.
Only two clear conclusions can be drawn from Justice White's opinion. First, to the
extent he used the identity of the profitmaking corporation to carve out a new, diluted first
amendment right, he departed from prior first amendment cases that have distinguished
among types of speech but not among types of speakers. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at
580-682. Second, however else Justice White viewed corporate identity he considered it relevant in the subsidiary sense; the identity of the speaker provided Massachusetts with an
"overriding" reason to regulate the speech.
As the majority in Bellotti pointed out, the question of whether the first amendment
protects corporate speech traditionally has depended on the value of the speech at stake and
the government's interest in regulating that speech. First amendment rights have not depended merely on the simple status of a corporation as a corporation. 435 U.S. at 778-79
n.14. The Court, however, has had considerable difficulty in applying the first amendment to
the military. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
In Greer, the Court (6-2) upheld military regulations that barred political speeches and distribution of literature from public areas of a military base unless the speaker received prior
approval from post headquarters. Because it was a military base, the majority concluded that
the commanding officer could exclude all civilians and prohibit all civilian political activities.
The majority did not rely on traditional first amendment analysis, which would demand
more than the majority's ruling in Greer that the policy of exclusion was evenhandedly applied and, therefore, acceptable. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.
Brennan agreed that military needs might justify restrictions on speech that otherwise would
be unconstitutional. Id at 861. He disagreed strenuously, however, with the majority's approach and the result that approach produced in Greer. He stated: "The Court's opinion
speaks in absolutes, exalting the need for military preparedness and admitting of no careful
and solicitous accommodation of First Amendment interests to the competing concerns that
all concede are substantial." 424 U.S. at 851. He chided the Court for its "unenlightening
generality" and emphasized that despite the majority's observation that " 'the primary busi-
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Returning to the issue of public employee free speech, when the
Supreme Court recognizes that public employees enjoy first amendment
rights but, as in Snepp, fails to protect those rights under traditional and
rigorous first amendment standards, it is doing one of two things. It is
either saying that identity as a public employee is, after all, important in
the threshold, fundamental sense and that public employees enjoy a different, diluted kind of first amendment right. Or, as Justice White may
have done in Bellott, it is simply confusing identity in its fundamental
and subsidiary senses. That is, the Court is allowing the government's
justification for not honoring free speech rights of public employees in
certain cases (subsidiary sense) to serve as the basis of changing the nature of the right itself (fundamental sense). That the Court is simply
confused is borne out by a fresh look at the question and by the Court's
own recognition in earlier cases, 82 and even occasionally now,83 that
public employees do enjoy first amendment rights as traditionally defined and protected.
B. The Case for Applying Traditional First Amendment
Standards to Employee Expression
The simple antidote for the confusion surrounding whether one's
identity as a public employee negates the existence or changes the nature of first amendment rights lies in traditional methods of constitutional analysis. 84 Conventional analysis looks first to the words of the
text as written or as interpreted from history, contemporaneous understanding, or the structure of the government as a whole. Second, it examines the nature of the right to determine whether the values at stake
are the same notwithstanding identity. Under such analysis it is plain
that public employees should enjoy full rights of freedom of expression.
First, there is nothing in the text of the first or fourteenth amendments, as written or as interpreted, that negates the rights of public employees. 85 Second, and more affirmatively, the values that underlie
ness of armies and navies [is] to fight or be ready to fight,' "id at 838, (quoting United States
ex tel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)), he stressed that "the training of soldiers does
not as a practical matter require exclusion of those who would publicly express their views
from streets and theater parking lots open to the general public." Id at 852.
82 E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
83 See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elvod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
84 Applying this method of analysis the Court has determined, for example, that only
persons and not fetuses enjoy the protections of the fourteenth amendment, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 13, rehAg denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), that corporations are "persons" for the purpose of
enjoying due process of law but not for the purpose of claiming the privilege against selfincrimination, Smith v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898) (corporation protected under due
process clause); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944) (corporations do not
enjoy privilege against self-incrimination because right is purely personal), and that students
no less than other persons are entitled to freedom of expression, Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
85 U.S. CONST. amend. I; id amend. XIV, § 1. One might speculate that in drafting the
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freedom of expression-self-fulfillment, the advancement of knowledge
and the discovery of truth, and preservation of an informed electorate 86 -are the same whether the speaker is a public employee or a private citizen.
Government limitation on employee speech can take many forms
but typically includes: (a) prohibiting public criticism of governmental
actions or public airing of job-related complaints, (b) limiting activities
outside of employment that "conflict" with governmental service, such
as political activities, (c) restricting contact with certain persons while
on or off the job, such as members of the press, (d) prohibiting authoritative statements made or having the appearance of having been made
as a governmental spokesperson, and (e) limiting specific information
87
that may not be revealed because it is confidential, sensitive, or secret.
In every instance-except limits on those acting as governmental
spokespersons-the intrinsic value of self-fulfillment is at stake to some
degree. Individuals do not shed their personal identities on the job. In
fact, the job may be the principal place where an individual interacts
with others, forms opinions, and expresses his views. It may be the
center of his social and political life.
Protecting employee expression also directly serves the instrumental
values fostered by the first amendment-knowledge, truth, and availability of public information. This becomes apparent as one recalls that
the government is the greatest single source of information about what is
going on in general and about its own activities in particular. Indeed, it
may be more crucial to protect employee speech than to protect the
speech of private citizens. Employees are uniquely situated to furnish
information about government action, inaction, and wrongdoing. They
are also in a direct position to influence policy and thus the entire society benefits if they are free to express their views fully and
independently.8
To appreciate the importance of allowing government employees to
engage in free speech protected by traditional first amendment standards, one need look no further than Frank Snepp. Snepp joined the
CIA as a young graduate student and served two tours of duty in Vietfourteenth amendment the Framers might have intended to distinguish between the state
acting in a govenmental capacity and a proprietary capacity, thus justifying a distinction
between the rights of private citizen-individuals and those of public employees. See, e.g., Van
Alstyne, supra note 45, at 1460-6 1.
86 See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 49, at 6-7; see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-65 (1976) (emphasizing public interest in free flow of information in free enterprise system); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 2426 (constitutional right of free expression intended to "produce a more capable citizenry and
a more perfect polity"), reh g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
87 See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 228 (Marshall, J., dissenting), reh'g denied,
417 U.S. 977 (1974).
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nam between 1970 and 1975. He left Vietnam during the fall of Saigon
when the United States was forced to quit the country in haste and
desperation. Snepp had served as the CIA's "principal briefer and political-strategic analyst at the [American] Embassy. 89m He returned from
Vietnam disillusioned with the CIA and yearning to tell what he had
learned from his inside position about the CIA's responsibility for the
fall of Saigon. 9° In writing Decent Interval he fulfilled his yearning and at
the same time contributed significantly to the public debate about the
United States' involvement in Southeast Asia.
Thus, examination of the underlying purpose of the first amendment and the values it serves leads to the conclusion that a person's
identity as a government employee does not negate otherwise applicable
rights.9 1 This conclusion, however, does not force a disregard of the obvious differences between employees and private citizens. Certainly public employees are more than just individual citizens who happen to work
for the government. They themselves constitute the government, and, if
government is to govern, it must have at least the power to ensure its
own effective operation. This necessitates implementing controls over
government employees that have no comparability to controls over private citizens. Government service requires standards of competence and
obedience, as well as rules regulating organizational behavior. 92 For example, although insulting language from a citizen is constitutionally tolerable as long as it falls short of an "unambiguous invitation to
brawl," 93 such language may permanently destroy an employee's effectiveness on the job.
Moreover, some employee activity is unique to government service.
Public employees have unique access to certain governmental information; they can control data completely unavailable to the public.9 4 In
addition, only public employees can speak for the government and, as
official representatives, can potentially cause more harm in exercising
their right of free expression than can private citizens. Obviously the
public will give more credence to a CIA spokesman's allegation that the
CIA has assassinated a political leader than to a private individual's.
Finally, public employees can engage in certain associational activities
that transcend the usual features of group activity. Because of their po89
90

F. SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL (1977).

Id
91 In this regard, employee speech is unlike even corporate speech, as to which some
argument can be made that first amendment values are not well or materially served. See First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
92 See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 49, at 567.
93
Ely, supra note 49, at 1493 (discussing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
94 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-72 (1968) (teachers' freedom
to express views on expenditures by school board essential because they are most likely to
have informed and definite opinions).
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sitions, public employees are a discreet group simultaneously dependent
upon and controlled by governmental and political leaders. As a dis95
creet group they are uniquely situated to exploit and to be exploited.
All of these unique needs and special problems associated with public employment must be taken into account, but they are matters important only in the subsidiary consideration of identity; they are merely
factors to be weighed under traditional first amendment rules in assessing the potential danger of the speech.
In constitutional terms, the following reformulated rules should
govern in all employee speech cases:
1. Public employee rights of free expression derive from the freedoms
protected by the first amendment;
2. An employee enjoys rights of free expression to the same extent as
any other citizen unless the nature of an employee's expression is
(a) uniquely incompatible with his status as an employee or
(b) an official government statement or
(c) a knowing disclosure of confidential information that is nonpublic and otherwise unavailable to the public
3. When employee expression or association falls into one of the three
categories listed in section two above, the government has a compelling interest sufficient to allow it to regulate that behavior, but the
means it uses must comply with traditional first amendment
96
doctrine.
95 See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 564-67 (1973).
96 See supra note 49. The salutary consequences of such an approach are indirectly illustrated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), a case that, by way of
analogy to government employees, considered the nature and scope of first amendment rights
of students. In Tinker, students challenged a district wide regulation forbidding the wearing
of armbands in school. The regulation was not part of a general prohibition on the wearing
of political symbols. It was a special rule adopted to thwart protest about United States
involvement in the Vietnam War. Such a rule, if applied to citizens generally, would violate
the first amendment's nearly total ban on suppression of particular political messages. But, as
a threshold matter, the Court had to determine whether students enjoyed the same rights as
other persons. The Court concluded that neither one's identity as a student nor the fact that
the expressive activity took place within a school rendered the first amendment inapplicable.
"[S]tudents in school as well as out of school," Justice Fortas wrote, "are 'persons' under our
Constitution. . . possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect." Id at 511.
The Court also concluded that neither identity nor context justified a dilution or watering
down of traditional first amendment protections. The Court acknowledged that the school
environment had special characteristics distinguishing it from conventional first amendment
arenas via a reasonableness standard, which balanced ad hoc the school's generalized fear of
disturbances from armbands against the students' interest in expression. Rather, the Court
extended "comprehensive protection," Ely, supra note 49 at 1492, to student speech by applying a kind of clear and present danger test. The armband regulation could not survive, the
Court said, because the expressive activity did not materially disrupt classwork or involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Although the Court should have expressed its clear and present danger standard more forcefully, it is plain that, although the
special interests of the government in controlling student behavior were taken into ac-
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Applying Traditional Standards to Police the Secrecy Methods
of Snepp and the Directive

Under these reformulated rules, public employee rights of free
speech will be taken seriously and, as a by-product, the intrusions that
both Snepp and the Directive make on employee expression can be effectively policed.97 In Snepp, the Court held that the government has a
"compelling" interest in "protecting . . . the secrecy of information
important to our national security," 98 and in preserving the "appearance of confidentiality" 99 and that the CIA's prepublication review
agreement, although a form of prior restraint, was enforceable by court
injunction as a valid and "reasonable means" of protecting the government's interests. I00 The court also held that where an employee breaches
a prepublication review agreement, as did ex-agent Snepp, the fairest,
most effective-and hence most appropriate' 0 '-remedy is a constructive trust imposed for the benefit of the government over all profits the
defendant might earn from the uncleared publication. Finally, the
Court concluded that prepublication review was congressionally authorized under statutory provisions requiring the CIA Director to
"'protec[t] intelligence sources and methods' from unauthorized
02
disclosure." 1
Each of these conclusions is suspect when measured against the reformulated standards. Again, these standards dictate that employee
speech must be governed by traditional first amendment standards.
These require that, when government regulations prohibit speech itself,
"the [Government] may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.
,"103 and that "the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest."' 10 4 Even then, the
Government must employ "means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
105
abridgement."'
Regarding the government's interest in controlling Snepp's expression, the government does have a legitimate, unique, and hence compelling interest as an employer in preventing its employees from disclosing
classified information acquired only by virtue of their employment. The
count, the government's regulation still had to measure up to rigorous first amendment standards. 393 U.S. at 512-14.
For a recent case upholding a prepublication review scheme under an analysis similar to
that employed here, see McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
97 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
98 Id.
99 Id
100
101
102

103
104
105

Id
Id at 515-16; see supra note 20.
Id (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976)).
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
Buckely v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
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public has no right of access to such information, and the government
employee's access is conditioned and premised upon maintaining confidentiality. 10 6 Thus, expression based on this information may be controlled so long as the forms of control meet otherwise applicable first
10 7
amendment tests.

The government's interest in Snepp in preserving the "appearance
of confidentiality" is quite different. First, it is empirically debatable
whether this interest can be appropriately characterized as "compelling." The Court relied on "[u]ndisputed evidence"'' 0 8 presented by the
Director of the CIA that "a CIA agent's violation of his obligation to
submit writings about the Agency for prepublication review impairs the
CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties" and, that as a result of
Snepp's expression and similar activities by others, CIA sources have
"discontinue[d] work with [the United States]" or "questioned whether
they should continue exchanging information with us." 10 9 Justice Stevens in his dissent viewed this "truncated" evidence skeptically, stating
that it was "difficult to believe that the publication of a book like
Snepp's, which does not reveal classified information, has significantly
weakened the Agency's position."' 110 Commentators have expressed similar doubts concerning the CIA's claims. They suggest that significant
leaks and consequent loss of confidence arise either from top officials'
intentional attempts to manipulate public opinion or the CIA's own lax
security procedures. 1 ' Given this divergence of opinion, it is at least
doubtful that the government actually proved the compelling nature of
its confidentiality interest.
Second, even assuming the CIA had made its case, it is extremely
unlikely that the government could prove a compelling interest in the
appearance of confidentiality outside of the narrow field of foreign intelligence. Although the CIA may have a plausible claim that prepublication review is necessary to assure foreign intelligence sources of
confidentiality, surely no similar justification can be made for extending
prepublication review to the thousands of employees now subject to it
under the Reagan Directive.
Finally and more fundamentally, the government's interest in appearing able to keep secrets-if divorced from its interest in keeping the
secrets themselves-is per se an illegitimate one. That is, the government may have a compelling interest in keeping classified information
secret and it may claim that it must censor classified and unclassified
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 49, 96.
108 444 U.S. at 512.
109 Id
110 Id at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111 See, e.g., Franck & Eisen, BalancingNational Securli
POL. 339, 353-56 (1982).
106

And Free Speech, 14 J. INT'L L. &
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information as the means of protecting secrets. But once the government
claims an independent interest in appearing able to keep secrets, its
claim, restated, is that it must be able to tell the world that its employees
say only that which the government sanctions."t 2 Such an interest fundamentally opposes all first amendment values.
Accepting that the government has a compelling interest in protecting classified information acquired in confidence, neither prepublication
review nor the potentially severe economic punishment of a constructive
trust are means carefully formulated to avoid unnecessary abridgement
of free speech interests. These methods of control are both underinclusive and overinclusive.
The constructive trust penalty is underinclusive because it fails to
deter the one-time-only ideological leaker who cares nothing for profits
from compromising classified data." t3 It is also overinclusive because it
may impose a severe economic fine on authors like Snepp whose writings
14
threaten no cognizable harm to the government."
Similarly, prepublication review, even when later joined with a
court imposed injunction, is underinclusive because it will not deter
those who leak for ideological reasons; it may not even deter the profit
seekers." 5 Yet such review is markedly overinclusive because it imposes
a lifelong obligation of preclearance whether or not the disclosure includes classified information and whether or not the information will
actually harm national security or merely embarrass public
policymakers.116
Prepublication review is especially overbroad in that, by its very
operation, it will delay or suppress unclassified criticism of government
policies by those most likely and able to offer it. 11 7 Indeed, the Directive
presents an information management scheme so unprecedented in scope
112 One commentator argued that the compelling interest in the appearance of confidentiality is problematic because the means chosen by the government to preserve this appearance will depend upon what appeases foreign intelligence agencies. "In the end, the
American civil liberties would live under the thumb of foreign veto." Medow, supra note 16,
at 827-28.
113 See, e.g., Franck & Eisen, sura note 111, at 356-57.
114
As Justice Stevens correctly concluded, the government has a legitimate interest in
preventing the disclosure of classified information. 444 U.S. at 518 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
115
Franck & Eisen, supra note 111, at 356-59.
116 The Administration has not offered specific justification for the Directive or given
specific examples of harm to national security that could have been avoided by prepublication review. See Pear, President Orders Curbs in Handlingof ClassifiedData, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12,
1983, at 1, col. 4; Lewis, Men ofZeal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1983, at A23, col. 1.
117
Abrams, supra note 22, at 25-26; Halperin, supra note 26, at 1-2. If prepublication
review had been instituted earlier, the requirement would have stifled a significant amount of
recent criticism and comment concerning foreign affairs and military matters. See Abrams,
supra note 22, at 25-26. One irony is that Stansfield Turner, the former CIA Director who
supervised the prepublication review scheme under President Carter, has himself been involved in a long wrangle with his former Agency over whether a book he has written does or
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that it may alter the entire nature of national public debate."18 The
change will be insidious but nevertheless real. The public will not know
what voices it did not hear or what those voices were precluded from
saying. Citizens may not even realize that what is written by any of
thousands of former top officials is a sanitized, government-approved
version. Furthermore, the very breadth of the Directive almost ensures
arbitrary application or, worse, favoritism toward "friendly critics.'u 19
In short, the nature and operation of this prior restraint, especially when
considered in light of our historical intolerance of such schemes, 20 renders it incompatible with traditional first amendment means
standards. 121
does not contain classified information. See Hersh, Ex-Intelligence DirectorDisputes Censorship of
His Book on C.I.A., N.Y. Times, May 18, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
118 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 22, at 22 (Reagan Administration's requirement of prepublication review "appears to be hostile to basic tenet of first amendment that democracy
requires informed citizenry to argue and shape policy").
119 There is evidence to suggest that the CIA has used its prepublication review system to
block publication of writings critical of the Agency. See, e.g., Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506,
509 (D.D.C. 1980) (Court indicated there was "factual issue" whether CIA's past enforcement
record has been "clouded by content considerations rather than wholly legitimate concerns
for security"). One flaw of prior restraints is that they allow for excessive review and discriminatory treatment. See T. EMERSON, supra note 49, at 9-10; Medow, supra note 16, at 820
(censors tend to oppose disclosure of embarrassing or politically damaging material).
120 Aversion to prior restraints is the foundation of first amendment doctrine. See L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 190, 193, 201-03, 206 (1960) (noting inference of Blackstonian concept that freedom
of press meant freedom from prior restraint). The prohibition against prior restraints, although not absolute, is subject to few exceptions. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 569-70 (1976) (threat to defendant's "fair trial rights" might justify restraint on first
amendment rights); see also Litwack, The Doctrine offt'or Restraint, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 519, 541-49 (1977) (prior restraint on obscenity and speech that will cause direct and
immediate harm to life or national security permissible); cf New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (" 'Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' " (quoting Baxter
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (vacating injunction prohibiting distribution of literature critical of
realtor's "blockbusting" because restraint unjustified). This constitutional disfavor is a reaction to the devastating efficiency with which prior restraints suppress expression, and a recognition of the tendency of prior restraints, once established, to expand beyond their original
boundaries. T. EMERSON, supra note 49, at 9-10.

121 The government may in an individual case be able to show that, unless the court
issues an injunction, an employee or former employee will disclose classified information acquired confidentially while on the job. See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (affirming injunction ordering Marchetti to provide CIA in advance any writing relating to Agency but remanding for revision of order to
limit its scope to classified information). Aside from the question of statutory authorization, it
is arguable that such an injunction is warranted but the court must be careful to specify and
limit the scope of its order. One commentator has suggested ways to refine the application of
prepublication review so that, in his opinion, it could survive constitutional scrutiny.
Anawalt,supra note 16, at 714-15. It is doubtful, however, that any adjustments could make
this a more precise and hence less drastic method of protecting the government's interest than
an alternative method based on specific, narrowly drawn criminal penalties. See, e.g., Franck
& Eisen, supra note 111, at 359-6 1; Medow, supra note 16, at 836-40. There is no general
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The final point of vulnerability of both Snepp and the Directive relates to whether the Executive has the authority without specific congressional approval to exact prepublication review promises from public
employees. Presumably, unilateral presidential power is insufficient, and
thus some form of congressional approval is necessary. 122 In Snepp, the
Court evidenced its implicit agreement with this presumption by finding
that the statutory charter of the CIA, which empowers the Director to
"protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,"' 123 authorized the CIA's system of prepublication review. It is unclear, however, what kind of approval is, or should be, necessary before
the Executive can request such promises.
If congressional silence or the most general grant of power, such as
the CIA charter or statutes establishing standards of employee conduct, 24 delegates such power to the Executive, then nothing short of
actual disapproval will negate it. Congress has come very close to such
disapproval by postponing implementation of the Directive's prepublicriminal penalty for unauthorized disclosures of classified information but certain statutes,
such as the Atomic Energy Act, criminalize the disclosure of particular kinds of classified
information. 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1976). Although the espionage laws are the principal statutes
governing disclosure of sensitive governmental information, these laws are limited to disclosures of national defense information made with intent to injure the national interest. They
are largely irrelevant to simple unauthorized disclosures of classified data. Internal Security
Act of 1950, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1982). See generaly Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes
and PublicationofDefense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973); Willard, Report of the
Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, C-2 to C-9
(Mar. 31, 1982) (on file at Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter cited as WILLARD REPORT].
Many analysts believe that criminal sanctions on the disclosure of classified information
are unwise as a matter of policy, see, e.g., Halperin & Hoffman, Secreqy And The Right To Know,
40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 132, 148-50 (1976) (there should be no criminal penalties for
"any and all disclosures of classified information"), or that subsequent punishment, "calculated as it is to suppress by a self censorship that evades judicial review," may be more dangerous to first amendment values than some forms of prior restraint. Mayton, Towarda Theovy
of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior
Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 270 (1982). Nevertheless most agree that criminal penalties are the strongest means constitutionally available to prevent employee disclosures of classified information. See, e.g., Franck & Eisen, supra note 111, at 359-66; Medow,
supra note 16, at 836, 838. The executive cannot, of course, establish criminal penalties by
executive order, cf. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)
("The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime. . . .'), and this may
explain the appeal of prepublication review to the current Administration).
122 See, e.g., Fleshman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem 0/PresidentialLegislation, 40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 14-19 (1976) (discussing "direct" or "implicit" means of congressional authorization for executive orders); Rosenberg, Byond The Limits OfExecutive Power:
PresidentialControlofAgeny Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 193, 246
(1981) (executive order to improve efficiency of Agency informal rulemaking procedures "exceed[ed] the proper bounds of presidential authority').
123 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
124 Eg., 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (1982) (provides for suspension or removal of certain federal
employees if such action is found to be "necessary in the interest of national security"). See
WILLARD REPORT, supra note 121, at C-9, C-10 ("There is not general statute providing for
such penalties or injunctive relief in cases of disclosure of classified information").
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cation review provisions until April 15, 1984.125 It remains unclear, how;ever, what action, if any, will be taken after that time. One might argue
that Congress has manifested sufficient disapproval in the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), which provides that disclosure, not secrecy,
must be the dominant objective. 126 But the FOIA does not specifically
outlaw prepublication review or any other particular secrecy scheme.
The question of executive authority to issue the Directive and how
that authority is manifested is closely related to the protection of the
first amendment rights of public employees. In this regard, it is crucial
to recall that under our constitutional scheme, liberty is preserved in
two fundamental ways. One way is by placing the regulation of certain
subjects beyond governmental control. The other way is by separating
12 7
and dividing governmental powers through "diffused sovereignty."'
When the judiciary is called upon to adjudicate the validity of governmental action against a claim of individual liberty, it may draw on both
methods of protection. At times governmental action involves an invasion of liberty that is neither so gross nor so clear that a court can confidently declare it substantively out of bounds. The action may be
sufficiently drastic, however, that the court seeks to ensure that the decisionmaking process that produced the action gave full account to the
liberty interest. This explains the courts' narrow construction of statutes
of doubtful constitutionality and their tendency to remand such matters
to the legislature for more careful reflection. 28 At other times the courts
confront governmental action that intrudes on liberty interests but the
nature of the issue is such that a court feels institutionally unable or
unwilling to set down precise or enduring substantive rules. Again, however, the curtailment of liberty is sufficiently serious that the courts will
129
require a clear statement that Congress approved of the action.
The courts should apply this approach to evaluation of prepublication review. Even if the courts remain institutionally hesitant to review
the Executive's methods of maintaining secrecy where those methods
tread heavily on free speech values, the question of the Executive's
125 Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98164, § 1010, 97 Stat. 1061 (1983)
126 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 n.6 (1973) (FOIA seeks "to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineating statutory language") (quoting S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965)).
127 See Tushnet, Following The Rules Laid Down: A Critique of InterpretivismAnd NeutralThnciples, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 784 (1983).
128

See, e.g., L. TRIBE, SUPRA note 49, at 1140-44.

129

In this regard, one factor in the Supreme Court's decision to deny the Executive a

prior restraint against publication of the Pentagon Papers was the lack of specific congres-

sional authorization. See id; cf.Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (requiring explicit
congressional or presidential approval for Defense Department security program that allowed
employees to be fired without opportunity to confront sources of derogatory information).
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power must be construed narrowly. 130 The principle of decision based
on the first amendment values would be this: A court might conclude
that the executive branch may not impose prepublication review on employees or otherwise seriously limit the free flow of governmental infor13 1
mation to the public without explicit, specific approval by Congress.
This last requirement, together with the exacting demands of traditional first amendment doctrine, would jeopardize all executive secrecy
schemes bottomed on prepublication review. They would surely doom
the methods validated in Snepp and sanctioned by the Directive.
III
WHAT CAN BE KEPT SECRET-REFORMULATING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

In addition to its intrusion upon the first amendment rights of government employees, the Snepp decision also failed to protect adequately
the "public's right to know" or the "right of access" to governmental
information. 3 2 The same criticism applies to the Directive, which more
133
severely affects the public's right to know.
A right to know claim may take one of two forms. The first, weak
form is based on the conventional first amendment argument that limitations on free expression are more serious if, in addition to affecting an
individual's rights, they limit the stock of ideas available to the public.1' 4 This form of the right to know argument is adequately accounted
130 Another approach for the courts is to heighten statutory requirements regulating executive secrecy in all cases where executive action raises significant first amendment issues.
See McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
131 The Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness to reject congressional "approvals" based on general statutes or inaction. Unfortunately, the Burger Court opinions tend to
correlate strongly with the outcome and not with the pristine question of constitutional interpretation. The Court's selective reading has led it, for example, to find approval in congressional silence in order to uphold the Secretary of State's passport revocation of a former CIA
agent who revealed the identity of CIA operatives in foreign countries. Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280 (1981); see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981) (Congress
"implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement"). At the same
time, the Court found language in the 1974 Developmentally Disabled Act, that is rather
specific, to be too ambiguous to create a right of minimally restrictive treatment for the mentally retarded. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Despite this
apparent bias toward reading statutes broadly in order to restrict liberty, the serious risk
posed to first amendment values by prepubliation review may prod the Court to reconsider its
past interpretations.
132 See Medow, supra note 16, at 823-24 ("Information concerning public issues is the
lifeblood of democracy; an uninformed citizenry is, by definition, an ineffective check on both
official misconduct and misguided policy.'; seea/so Cox, supra note 15, at 9, 10 (right to know
issue was at least serious enough to warrant fuller consideration by Court).
133 See Abrams, supra note 22, at 22; Halperin supra note 26, at 2; President Orders Curbs In
Handling Of Classifed Data, supra note 24, at 1, col. 4; supra notes 22-30 and accompanying
text.
134 See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845-46 (1978)
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for by reformulating the first amendment rights of government
employees. 135
The second, strong form of the right to know argument focuses on
136
an independent public right of access to governmental information.
It imposes an affirmative governmental obligation to disclose.' 37 This
right is not simply coextensive with a speaker's rights; it can exist even if
a speaker may be constitutionally silenced. This right transcends the
weak form of the right to know because it posits a right to receive information that the government may be unwilling to share. 138
The right of access is a direct claim to information and it is only
(invalidating state statute imposing criminal sanction for divulging information relating to
state judicial review commission hearings); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
496-97 (1975) (invalidating state statute prohibiting publishing name of rape victims). Some
commentators have suggested that the only reasons to protect the speaker are the public's
right to know and the value of political discussion. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM (1960); Bork, Neutral Pinclesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2426 (1971); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245. The
Supreme Court has "rejected suggestions that the scope of the first amendment be limited to
narrow categories such as 'political speech."' Emerson, supra note 44, at 440. The Court,
instead, has accepted the traditional first amendment values: "(1) Individual self-fulfillment;
(2) the advancement of knowledge and (3) participation in decisionmaking by all members of
society; and (4) the discovery of truth, maintenance of proper balance between stability and
change." Id at 423, 440. Nevertheless, the Court has, in other contexts, manifested its concern for the public's right to know. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)
("[T]he First Amendment. . .prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock of information
from which members of the public may draw.")
135 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
136 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Emerson, The.4ftrmaive Side Of The First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv. 795, 828-31 (1981); Emerson, Legal Foundations Of The Right To Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 14-20 [hereinafter cited as Emerson, Legal
Foundations];Note, The First Amendment Right To GatherState-HeldInformation, 89 YALE L.J. 923
(1980).
137 The Supreme Court has generally rejected the argument that the Constitution imposes affirmative obligations on the government. It has found that the equal protection
clause does not guarantee minimum governmental services. San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(same). There is no constitutional right to government subsidies even when the funds facilitate the exercise of constitutional rights. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The right
of access to governmental information has been criticized because it suggests an affirmative
governmental obligation to disclose information and is said to contravene the Constitution's
essentially "negative" character. See BeVier, supra note 10, at 516. The distinction between
affirmative and negative rights, even if valid, is more difficult to draw than might first appear.
The Court is correct to "reject the 'notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully
realized unless they are subsidized by the State,'" Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
103 S.Ct. 1997, 2001 (1983) (quoting Commanaro v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959)
(Douglas, J., concurring)), but surely a right of access is not an "affirmative" right in that
sense. One might even cast the right of access as a "negative" right; the right to be free of
governmental interference designed to prevent the natural and inevitable flow of information
from the government to the people.
138 For a more elaborate discussion of the difference between these two forms of the right
to know, see BeVier, supra note 10, at 485-88. See also BeVier,Justice Powell and The First
Amendment's "SocietalFunction" A PreliminaqyAnalysis,68 VA. L. REv. 177, 182-85 (1982) [hereinafter cited as BeVierJusice Powell].

EXECUTIVE SECRECY

1984]

indirectly related to how secrets are kept. It presupposes the competence
of courts to supervise executive decisions concerning what information
139
government may keep secret and what information it must disclose.
Nevertheless, it is relevant to Snepp and the Directive-methods of control-on the theory that prepublication review operates to keep too
much information secret. Critics contend for example that the Directive
will "cut off most of the information that Americans rely on to understand foreign affairs"' 140 and "drastically alter the conditions of public
141
debate on national security issues."
Constitutional scholars have long argued that the first amendment
embodies a "right to know" of the strong form discussed above, guaranteeing a right of access to governmental information. 142 The thesis, in
brief, is that a central purpose of the first amendment is to protect and
sustain the process of representative democracy by maintaining an informed electorate. Because the government is best able to provide information concerning its own activities, the public has a right of access to
information within the government's control in order to maintain and
nourish the democratic process. 43 This thesis was developed by Professor Thomas Emerson in an early and influential article in which he described the right of access as the "right of the public to obtain
information from the government."' 144 "If democracy is to work," he
argued, "the public, as sovereign, must have all information available in
14 5
order to instruct its servants, the government."'
The same line of thinking is found in opinions of Justices Powell,
Stevens, and Brennan. l4 Justices Powell and Stevens locate the right of

140
141
142

Se BeVier, supra note 10, at 508-12.
President Orders Curbs In Handling of ClassfiedData, supra note 24, at 11, col. 2.
Halperin, supra note 26, at 2.
E.g., Emerson, Legal Foundations, supra note 136, at 14-17.

143

Id

144

Id at 14.

145

Id

139

146 Although all three Justices recognize a right of access, their individual support for this
notion rests on somewhat different theoretical bases. Justice Powell, for example, adopts the
premise that the first amendment protects "public discussion of governmental affairs." Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
adopts the same premise. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31 n.20 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). From this Stevens concludes that "information gathering is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection." 438 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added). This view represents the
minimal right of access. It suggests that the courts might constitutionally police secrecy practices to ensure that such practices do not unnecessarily limit the flow of information concerning governmental action. Justice Brennan's "structural" model also proceeds from the first
amendment's relationship to self government. For Brennan, the basic value is not simply to
protect discussion of public affairs, but rather to preserve democracy itself. Brennan, Address
byJustice Brennan, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 173, 175-77 (1979). Government has an obligation to
safeguard the indispensible conditions of democracy, namely the opportunity for individuals
to see, to understand, and to criticize the operations of government. Id Brennan's view
might be termed the expansive right of access. If followed to its logical conclusion, it would
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access in the "'societal function of the First Amendment,' "147 and Justice Brennan finds it in the "structural" role of the guarantee. 148 According to Justices Powell and Stevens, the first amendment embodies
more than "individualistic values" of the right to speak and to hear. It
includes the societal interest in maintaining the integrity of the political
process and the ability of the public to assert meaningful control over
governmental action. 149 This can only be done if there is "informed
public debate" about governmental affairs.' 50 For Justice Powell, the
societal function of the first amendment requires that the government
"substantially accommodate the public's legitimate interest in a, free
flow of information and ideas" about governmental affairs such as the
operation of federal prisons. 15 1 Similarly, Justice Brennan's "structural"
interpretation obligates the government to provide the information that
is necessary to meaningful discussion of governmental affairs.' 52 The
first amendment guarantees that the people remain able, through obser53
vation and discussion, to govern themselves.'
There are two basic objections to a constitutional right of access.
The first is that the first amendment cannot legitimately be read to provide such a right.' 54 This argument proceeds from a narrow, interpretivist 155 reading of the constitution, a view that constitutional rights
place a constitutional duty on the government to enhance communication and public discussion of public affairs.
147
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31 n.20 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)). See BeVier,
justrice Powell, supra note 138, at 182-88 (criticizing Justice Powell's "societal function"
analysis).
148
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-89 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Brennan, supra note 146, at 176-77.
149
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In addition
to safeguarding the right of one individual to receive what another elects to communicate, the
First Amendment serves an essential societal function."); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Tihese individualistic values ...
are not directly implicated ....
What is at stake here is the societal function of the First
Amendment.').
150 Sabe, 417 U.S. at 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[P]ublic debate must not only be
unfettered; it must also be informed.").
151 Id at 872.
152 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 & n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Cox, supra
note 15, at 150-54 (analyzing Justice Brennan's "structural" thesis).
153 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
154
BeVier, supra note 10, at 499-503.
155 Interpretivism (not to be confused with literalism) requires that judges "confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution." J.
ELY, DEMOCRAcY AND DIsTRUsT 1 (1980). Noninterpretivism accepts the legitimacy of a
judge's going outside the text, playing an "additional role as the expounder of basic national
ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment." Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?,
27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 706 (1975). The literature presenting the debate between interpretivists and noninterpretivists is extensive. Compare J. ELY, supra (espousing process-oriented
approach that steers path between interpretivism, which is impossible, and noninterpretivism
which is illegitimate) with M. PERRY, THE CONSTITuTION, THE COURTS AND HuMAN
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must rest directly on the constitutional text, its history, or the structure
of government it prescribes. Under this view, because neither the text
nor the history indicates the existence of a right of access, the only possible basis ofjustification lies in the constitutional system of representative
self government.1 56 This too is unavailing, according to the critique,
because self government under our system does not, in fact or theory,
contemplate or require continuous public involvement in the day-to-day
affairs of government.

5 7

The interpretivist position is flawed, however, because the right of
access does not depend on a constitutionally based Massachusetts-townmeeting-like model of self government. For Justice Brennan, for example, it proceeds from the idea that the first amendment protects the right
of people ultimately to govern and the notion that governing means witnessing in order to learn about, discuss, and check governmental action. 158 It is a concept quite at home with a functional reading of
constitutional guarantees-a reading well supported by prior prece0
dent.' 5 9 One thing is certain: it would not be contra-constitutiona'16
to
find a constitutional right of access in the first amendment's protections
of speech and assembly. Beyond this, the view of interpretivists and
noninterpretivists may remain irreconcilable.
The second, more substantial claim raised against the right of access formulation is that courts lack a principled way to apply or confine
it.161 A right may "exist" in the Constitution but unless the courts are
able to apply it in a principled way, 162 it is not a judicially enforceable
RIGHTS (1982) (offering functional justification for noninterpretivist review) and Bork, supra

note 134, at 8 (presenting straightforward interpretivist position: "The judge must stick close
to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights.").
156
BeVier, supra note 10, at 503-06.
157

See id.

See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584-89 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also Blasi, supra note 49, at 554-67 (first amendment serves "checking" function that should equalize power of press on behalf of public and government). This right of
access argument can also rest on the view that first amendment protection of discussion of
public affairs demands some protection for information gathering. See supra note 146.
159 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 580 ("[F]undamental
rights, even though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right to travel); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of
association).
160 That is, there is nothing in the Constitution that proscribes "reading in" a right of
access. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 155, at 20; see also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
158

A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREMiE COURT xvii-xviii (1980).
161 See BeVier, supra note 10, at 509-12; O'Brien, The First Amendment And The Public's
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:

"Right To Know," 7 HASTING CONsT. L.Q. 579 (1980).
162 Theorists agree that the legitimacy of the Court's constitutional protection of values
not plainly derived from the text must lie in the exercise of a Court function compatible with
representative democracy and appropriate to an institution that is insulated from the political
process. See J. ELY, supra note 155, at 75 n.*. Although commentators disagree over what
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right. The issue comes to this: By what standard can the courts decide
how much information is sufficient to make democracy work? 163 Since
all government information is arguably relevant to informed decisionmaking, even supporters acknowledge that a right of access is "theoretically endless."' 164 Similarly by what standard will the courts determine
what secrets must be kept secret? How much room must be left to the
Executive to perform his constitutional duties and to carry out the task
of document classification; a task that even Congress seems to agree he is
best positioned to do? 16 5 The difficulty in applying a first amendment
right of access has generally restricted the protection of a "right to
know" to the traditional protection accorded those who seek ideas and
information from willing sources. It no doubt explains why the
Supreme Court has tended to reject the argument that the public possesses a right of access to information within the government's control.
The question of the public's right to extract information from an
unwilling government first arose in three cases involving press access to
prisons. In Pell v. Procunier16 6 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 167 the
press argued that face-to-face interviews with specific inmates was essential to fair and accurate reporting on prison conditions and challenged
state and federal regulations that barred such interviews.168 The issue of
a right of access was squarely raised because there was no governmental
restraint on publication of information that the press had already acquired and no limitation on gathering information from willing sources
that function should be, see supra note 155, there must be some difference between the politicallegislative task and the judicial constitutional task. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 1-33 (1962). A court's decision is principled and hence different from a legislative
decision if it (1) identifies the protected right and articulates the rationale for awarding it
fundamental status and (2) defines and defends a rule to protect that right that is sufficiently
neutral and general to transcend the particular case. See A. BICKEL, supra; M. PERRY, sufra
note 155; Wechsler, TowardNeutral ti"nciles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HNARV. L. REv. I (1959).
But see Tushnet, supra note 127, at 781 (doubting viability of neutral principles because they
depend on nonexistent or weakly shared understanding or consistency of meaning).
163 See BeVier, supra note 10, at 506-08.
164
Brennan, supra note 146, at 177. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the
Court held that a newspaperman could be constitutionally required to appear and testify
before a grand jury. Discussing the press's right to gather news, the Court stated:
"There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious
argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of
unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the
country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a
First Amendment right."
Id at 684 n.22 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
165 See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)(A) (1982) (removing from public
view "matters that are specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret").

166
167

417 U.S. 817 (1974).
417 U.S. 843 (1974).

168

Pell, 417 U.S. at 819-21; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844-45.
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outside the government. Nevertheless, a divided Court upheld the regulations but sidestepped the right of access issue. Writing for the majority
in both cases, Justice Stewart characterized the press's challenge as a
claim of "special access to information not shared by members of the
public generally" 169 and disposed of it on the narrow ground that the
70
Constitution does not require preferential treatment for the press.'
Nevertheless, the tenor of the Court's opinion combined with Justice
Stewart's later comment that "[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or
controlled by government,"' 7' support the view that Pell and Saxbe im1 72
plicitly reject a right of access.
In Houchins v. KQED, 173 the Court expressly rejected the right of
access. The holding was clouded, however, by a discussion of preferential press access and a four-to-three plurality decision. 174 In Houchins,
the plurality rejected a television station's claim that the first amendment protected the right of the press to film portions of a county jail
where conditions had become a matter of public controversy. 175 Speaking for three Justices, Chief Justice Burger stated that "until the political branches decree otherwise, as they are free to do, the media have no
special right of access to the Alameda County Jail different from or
greater than that accorded the public generally."' 176 But the Chief Justice preceded this statement with a general rejection of a right of access-whether for the press or the public: "Neither the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access
177
to government information . . . within the government's control."'

The right of access claim is flawed, he said, because "it invites the Court
to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to the political processes."' 78 Furthermore, he stated,
"[b]ecause the Constitution affords no guidelines, absent statutory stan169 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834 (footnote omitted).
170 Id at 834-35.
171 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
172 But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582-84 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (reading Houchins and Saxbe narrowly).

173 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
174 The precedential significance of Houchins is also unclear because of later interpretations by the individual Justices. Houchins can be read narrowly to hold that the press is entitled to no greater rights of access than the public. See, e.g., J. BARRON & C. CIENES,
CONsTrruToNAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 944 (2d ed. 1982). Alternatively, it may
stand for a general rejection of a right of access, albeit with only four Justices supporting that
interpretation. In Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan read the prior cases as "not rul[ing]
out a public access component to the First Amendment...." 448 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
175 438 U.S. at 8-16.
176 Id at 16.
177 id at 15.
178 Id at 12.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[[Vol. 69:690

dards, hundreds of judges would ... be at large to fashion ad hoc standards, in individual cases, according to their own ideas of what seems
'desirable' or 'expedient.' ",179
Avoiding the access issue entirely, the majority in Snepp made no
mention of a public right to know and the dissenters referred to it only
in the weak sense of the public's interest in receiving information provided by a willing speaker.'8 0 This is somewhat surprising because, at
the time Snepp was handed down, the Court was considering Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 18 1 in which it subsequently held, for the first
time, that the first amendment embodies a right of access to at least
some governmental information. 18 2 That Snepp cast his defense in
terms of his individual right might explain the Court's silence.' 83 Perhaps, however, the Snepp ruling reflects the problems in applying a right
of access and the Justices' uncertainty over its existence, nature, and
scope. 184

The difficulty of applying the right of access also explains the
widely divergent views of the Justices in Richmond Newspapers. There the
Court struck down a state statute that permitted trial closures at the
unfettered discretion of the judge and the parties. 185 Eight Justices participated and, of the seven who agreed that the statute violated the first
amendment, six wrote separate opinions. The most elaborate and distinct analyses of the right of access emerge from Chief Justice Burger's
plurality opinion for the Court and from Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion. 186
The Chief Justice first reviewed the long history of open criminal
trials and concluded that openness was an "indispensable attribute" of
the courts' functioning. 87 He acknowledged, however, that the right to
attend a criminal trial is not expressly guaranteed under the Constitu179

Id

at 14.

180 In a recent court of appeals decision upholding prepublication review, one member of
the three judge panel wrote separately for the purpose of discussing the effect such secrecy
schemes have on the public's right of access to government information. Although concluding that the courts have neither the authority nor the competence to "'balance' the public's
right to know against an acknowledged national security risk," Judge Wald said that it was
important for "some governmental institution, if not the classification system itself, to conduct such a balance." McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J.,
separate statement).
181 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
182 Id at 575-780; see infla text accompanying notes 185-97.
183 United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 177-78 (E.D. Va. 1978), reo'd in part, 595
F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), reinstated, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
184 See infra text accompanying notes 185-96.
185 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).
186 For a discussion of Richmond Newspapers and an analysis of the opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan, see BeVier, Like Mackerel In The Moonlight: Some Reftections on
Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311 (1982).
187 448 U.S. at 569.
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tion and that historical practice is insufficient to establish a constitutional right. Nevertheless, he concluded that a right of access is implicit
in, and "indispensable to," the expressly guaranteed rights of freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly.1 88 These freedoms, he stated, "share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government," including the criminal justice system. 189 This core purpose would lose its "meaning" if there were
no right of access to the system't 0 because intelligent communication
would be precluded. The Chief Justice's opinion contained no hint of
his earlier view in Houchins that "no discernible basis for a constitutional
duty to disclose"191 exists; indeed, the Chief Justice offered a broad justification for a right of access. Yet, presumably because he feared the
complications of a general right of access, he artificially limited the
reach of his analysis to criminal trials.' 92 The Chief Justice distinguished the prison access cases by observing that prisons, unlike courts,
do not share a long tradition of openness.' 9 3 Although understandable,
this reasoning is ultimately unpersuasive because the Chief Justice failed
to provide a principle consistent with his own first amendment rationale
that would limit the theory expounded in Richmond Newspapers to criminal trials.
Even Justice Brennan, who unmistakably tied the right of access to
the broad "structural" purpose of the first amendment-protecting public discussion about public institutions in order to ensure popular control over government19 4-- displayed concern that "the stretch of this
protection is theoretically endless."' 95 He cautioned that rights of access
must be invoked with "discrimination and temperance"' 96 and offered
two limiting principles:
First, the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from
an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information. ... Second, the value of access must be measured in specifics . . . [W]hat is crucial in individual cases is

whether access to a particular government process is important in
terms of that very process.' 9 7
188

Id at 580.
Id at 575.
190 Id at 576-77; cf id at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
191 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14.
192 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-78. Chief Justice Burger began his opinion by
stating: "The narrow question presented in this case is whether the right of the public and
press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United States Constitution." Id at
558.
193 Id at 576 n.1l.
194 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
195 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Brennan,
189

supra note 146, at 177).
196 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring).
197 Id at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Although more elaborate, these limitations are no more principled
or persuasive than those of the Chief Justice; they create logical inconsistencies with Justice Brennan's broad structural first amendment rationale. 198 Brennan's formulation does explain the outcome in Richmond
Newspapers; criminal trials have traditionally been open, and public access to trials supports the goals of public confidence, accurate fact-finding, and citizen observation of a process akin to legislative lawmaking-all goals that Brennen finds are part of the trial process itself.
His formulation does not, however, justify access to other institutions
such as prisons, which Justice Brennan previously supported. 99 Access
to prisons arguably satisfies neither condition. Prisons have not enjoyed
a tradition of openness and the goals of the prison process-punishment
and rehabilitation-are not served by the presence of the public. 2 00 It is
not enough to say that the operation of a prison seeks to inspire confidence because that position sets no limits at all-all government institutions and practices are presumably intended to inspire public
confidence.
More fundamentally, Justice Brennan's limits are relevant only to
claims of access to governmental institutions, and not access to particular governmental information. Indeed, the entire question of limiting a
right of access is best presented by the difficult issue of how to apply the
right to a public request for a particular document, be it a CIA file, a
report of a presidential advisory commission, or a plan for a new military weapon. It is precisely here that the subjectivity of access standards
is revealed. In Saxbe, Justice Powell suggested that the guide should be a
judicious, sensitive, particularized balance of competing interests.2 0 '
The Court would carefully, on a case-by-case basis, weigh the public's
need to have certain information against the government's need to keep
that information secret.20 2 Or, as Justice Brennan suggested elsewhere:
"This inquiry is impersonal, almost sociological in nature. . . . [T]he
Court must weigh the effects of the imposition inhibiting press [and
public] access against the social interests served by the imposition. '20 3
Such a deferential, careful, and even meticulous approach may be comforting but it still does not indicate what weights will be accorded the
different interests, and it does not explain how a final decision will be
198

See BeVier, supra note 186, at 336-39.

199

See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19-40 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

200

But see id at 36-38 (some public presence necessary to ensure fair treatment of in-

mates). For further elaboration of the "fairness" basis of a right of access, see infra notes 219-

26 and accompanying text.
201 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
202 Id at 864-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
203
Brennan, supra note 146, at 177.
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any less a standardless, second-guessing of Executive secrecy
204
decisions.
Professor Emerson suggests a somewhat more specific approach
that analyzes the right of access from the fundamental principle that
citizens have a right to "all information in the possession of the government" because all such information is relevant. 20 5 Professor Emerson
recognizes that evolution of a right to know through judicial review of
public information requests will involve "a long and tedious process,"
but he suggests that progress is already at hand by looking to the model
2°
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 6
The problem with all such "presumptively open" approaches, however, is that they must inevitably make exceptions, and the exceptions
are the issue. As Emerson himself concedes, some "scrupulously limited" exceptions are necessary. He lists as one example "sensitive national security data," which he would limit to "tactical military
movements, design of weapons, operation of espionage or counterespionage, and similar matters. '20 7 Yet, Emerson's formulation, like other
schemes that presume that information will be generally available, offers
no clear guidance as to whether or to what extent courts should independently assess the propriety of exceptions. On the one hand, courts
could make an independent judgment on the validity of exceptions and
again address the problems of standards, competence, and potential
usurpation of presidential prerogatives. The courts would thereby commit themselves to a massive, case-by-case undertaking concerning issues
that are not best handled by open review, formal rules, or even reasoned
elaboration. 20 8 On the other hand, courts could follow the FOIA
model-itself a questionable suggestion because the FOIA was the product of a long process of political compromise and expediency2 0 9 -and
essentially give the President free rein in deciding what information
210
should be kept secret.
Under the FOIA, as long as information is properly classifiable
under the criteria established by an executive order and the information
is in fact properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure.2'1 The courts
are empowered to inquire into the procedural and substantive validity
BeVier, supra note 10, at 509-12.
Emerson, Legal Foundations,supra note 136, at 16 (emphasis added).
Id. at 17.
207 Id
208 See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 10, at 508-12.
209 Id at 513 n.117.
210 There is a third alternative which links the FOIA to a constitutional rights protection.
That is, wherever, as in Snepp, serious constitutional objections are raised, national security
classifications will be reviewed under a heightened standard and lose the usual presumption
of regularity that the courts afford. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
211 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982); see, e.g., Halperin v. Department of State, 565 F.2d 699,
702-03 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
204
205
206
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of a particular classification but the critiera for such inquiry are established by the Executive. 2 12 More important, although a court may conduct in camera inspection of disputed documents to reach its conclusion
and may disagree with a particular classification decision, proper classification is almost always a matter proved by extrinsic evidence. Only
where classification judgments are based on "claims too sweeping or
suggestive of bad faith" will a court go beyond government affidavits in
support of its actions. 21 3 In this regard Professor Henkin was surely
right when he suggested that court review of specific secrets is doomed to
fail: "Inevitably the courts will have to legislate gross categories ('diplomatic correspondence,' 'internal memoranda') and even then virtually
rubber stamp (and legitimate) governmental concealment. In the result
there will be

. .

2 14

.few cases in which the Court will in fact reverse the

Executive.
These difficulties do not mean that the courts have no role to play
in supervising secrecy decisions; rather they indicate that the courts' role
must be limited. To sketch the proper approach it is necessary to distinguish between two separate types of access-the right of access to governmental information and the right of access to governmental
institutions. Current doctrine draws no such distinction, but it is the key
to understanding the nature of a right of access and to understanding
what the courts have in fact done.
With respect to access to information, there appears no principled,
workable way for the courts to review the validity of particular secrecy
decisions. Instead, the courts' role should be confined to that suggested
by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Houchins-policingand striking down
official policies or processes of concealment that arbitrarily cut off the
flow of information about governmental affairs. 2 15 In other words, the
courts are charged with reviewing the system of secrecy, but not the
secrets themselves. If the system is overbroad and beyond all reasonable
needs of secrecy, then it violates a first amendment-based right of access
to governmental information.
Plainly there is ambiguity here, as the approach suggested is almost
intuitive. There must be some implicit standard against which to measure the legitimacy of secrecy to determine whether a particular system is
overbroad; a standard that will undoubtedly vary among different
212

S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12,reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.

NEws 6267, 6290; see, e.g., Halperin v. Department of State, 565 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
213 Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Bell v. United States,
563 F.2d 484, 487 (Ist Cir. 1977). But see McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
214 Henkin, supra note 10, at 279.
215 438 U.S. at 34-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In this regard, the right of access would theoretically be the minimal one suggested by
Justice Stevens and not the expansive one offered by Justice Brennan. See supra note 146.
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judges. Yet the objective itself is not in doubt: to correct what James
Bradley Thayer in another context called "clear mistakes. '2 16 Establishing such an objective is an acceptable and judicially familiar way of
controlling manifest excesses. This approach may even create a sufficient in terrorem effect if once applied successfully.
The only circumstances in which a court would be constitutionally
justified in examining particular secrets and ordering their disclosure are
those in which reasonable grounds exist to believe that the President or
executive officials are using secrecy to cover up violations of federal
law. 2 17 This exception is necessary to ensure that official action is not
above the law. Although judicial action in this situation may be no less
of an intrusion into "political" decisionmaking, executive compliance
with the law is a basic prerequisite of constitutional government. In
addition, the need the invoke the exception will be, presumably, limited.
The information access approach suggested here is not directly relevant in challenging a specific case of prepublication review. It may,
however, form the basis for a challenge to the entire system of prepublication clearance or the entire classification system on which prepublication review rests. The current classification order, for example, is
arguably a "clear mistake," which produces a manifestly excessive se218
crecy system.
With respect to access to governmental institutions, the difficulty of
applying the first amendment right of access should lead to consideration of whether this aspect of the right might be more appropriately
based on a due process guarantee of open process than on a first amendment right to know or be informed. In essence, the chief value at stake
in the institutional access cases is not a better working democracy but
216 Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L.
REv. 129 (1893).
217 Cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see Paust, Is The PresidentBoundby the
Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign Afairs and NationalSecurity Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 719, 765 (1982). It should be noted that the current Executive order governing classification specifically prohibits classifying information "to conceal violations of law" Exec. Order
No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166, 170 (1983).
218 The current executive order on classification requires that all doubts about classification be resolved in favor of secrecy. To classify information, a bureaucrat need not find that
"identifiable" harm to national security would result from publication, and he need not consider at all the public benefits served by disclosure. When viewed against the Executive's
inability to demonstrate the need for such provisions, the clear past trend in favor of greater
openness, and the demonstrated record of over-classification under more liberal classification
schemes, see Hearings on the Reagan Administration Proposalto Revise the E.0. on National Security
Information, Before the Subcomm. on Government Information andIndvidualRights of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), these and other increased secrecy features,
see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), make the current Directive a clear and
excessive obstruction of public access to governmental information. But see McGehee v.
Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding constitutionality of provisions of former
classification order and suggesting approval of current order).
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rather protection against arbitrary governmental action. 2 19 The right of
institutional access is not so much based on a desire to know what is
going on so that the citizenry can vote approval or disapproval or otherwise practice democracy; rather, it is more a desire to acquire information in order to stop improper governmental behavior or, by public
scrutiny, prevent it from ever occurring. Because the due process clause
directly embodies the fundamental idea that government may not exercise coercive power over individuals in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, a right of access anchored in due process permits the
expression of the implicit view that fuels most access demands, namely,
that secret government is presumptively arbitrary.
Such an approach also generates a normative standard that the judiciary may apply in a principled way: whenever the government operates directly and coercively on individuals, the process by which that
action is taken is presumptively open. Thus, public access to institutions
such as legislatures, 220 courts, 22 1 jails,2 22 mental institutions, schools, the
military, 223 and even "company towns" 224 shall be the norm unless the
government can show overriding and legitimate reasons for curtailing
public access. At the same time this approach would suggest natural
limits on the right-limits based on the prospect of direct, coercive governmental power over individuals and on the special, specific, and
proven needs of the institution. They would not be, as others have suggested, the rather arbitrary or uncertain limits arising from historical
practice or the role of a particular institution in preserving the workings
225
of democracy.
The new right of open process for institutions would not aid a chal219 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 592 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
221

Id

at 580-18.

222 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974).
223 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
224 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
225

Protecting against arbitrary, coercive government behavior is the common theme in

the opinions that recognize a right of access to courts and to prisons. In Richmond Newspapers,
ChiefJustice Burger spoke of the need to keep courts open to ensure justice, 448 U.S. at 569,
and Justice Brennan stated that openness is an "effective restraint on possible abuse ofjudicial power" and necessary to a system ofjustice that demonstrates the fairness of law to our

citizens. Id at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
Similarly, in Houchins, Justice Stevens argued for access to prisons and prisoners in these
words: "[The prisoner] retains constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment,. . . a protection which may derive more practical support from access to information
about prisons by the public than by occasional litigation in a busy court." 438 U.S. at 36-37
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). The emphasis on openness as a
safeguard against arbitrariness also explains Justice Stevens's comment in Richmond Newspapers that it was "somewhat ironic that the Court should find more reason to recognize a right
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lenge to prepublication review, but prepublication review challenges
may be the catalyst to force an entire rethinking of right of access issues.
That rethinking should begin with a distinction between access to institutions and access to information, as suggested here. To paraphrase Justice Black, the surest foundation for a constitutional right is a specific
2 26
understanding of what that right does and does not include.
CONCLUSION

Professor Alexander Bickel once suggested that, when it comes to
withholding information from the public, the President can constitutionally do as he pleases. "[T]he power to arrange security at the source,
looked at in itself, is great," and "the law in no wise guarantees its prudent exercise or even effectively guards against its abuse. '227 The only
countervailing powers that Professor Bickel perceived were the institu228
tionalized press and the political process.
This article argues that there is another countervailing power,
namely, the courts. In the name of the Constitution, the courts have a
significant role to play in keeping governmental secrecy within bounds.
First, with respect to the methods of secrecy, the courts must require the
Executive to respect meaningful free speech rights of public employees.
This will mean judging employee free speech issues under traditional
and rigorous first amendment standards and abandoning the reasonableness test that now gives the government broad authority to regulate
merely because the identity of the speaker is a public employee. It will
also mean that the courts must reinvigorate a structural check on secrecy abuse by invoking the so-called clear statement rule. The courts
must insist that Congress specifically approve all executive secrecy actions, such as prepublication review, that significantly diminish individual rights of free expression or seriously curtail public access to
governmental information.
Second, with respect to the keeping of particular secrets, the courts
should review the system or guidelines under which secrecy decisions are
made in order to ensure that they do not arbitrarily and unnecessarily
deny information to the public or operate to cover up violations of law.
of access today than it did in Houchins; Houchins involved the plight of a segment of society
least able to protect itself. . . ." 448 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
This new constitutional right of open process would validate the result reached in Richmond Newspapers on first amendment grounds but would require reversal in the prison cases
where despite the absence of clear and compelling need for secrecy access was denied.
226 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952) (Black, J., concurring) ("[The]
accordion-like qualities of this [Frankfurter due process] philosophy must inevitably imperil
all the individual liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.") (footnote
omitted).
227 A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 80.
228

Id

at 80-81.
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This will not directly affect the validity of prepublication review, but it
may provide the basis for challenging the entire system of document
classification on which prepublication review rests. More generally, the
inquiry into the courts' proper role in policing specific secrets may lead
to a more refined approach to access issues and, ultimately, to the recognition of a new due process-based right of access to government
institutions.

